THE PROCEEDINGS

of

The South Carolina Historical Association

1977

CONTENTS

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The South Carolina Historical Association supplies the PROCEEDINGS to all its members. The Executive Committee elects the Editor. Beginning in 1935, every fifth number contains an index for the preceding five years.

THE PROCEEDINGS

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The South Carolina Historical Association

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JAMES O. FARMER, JR.
Editor

LANCASTER
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

MINUTES

South Carolina Historical Association

Annual Meeting – 1977

The Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association convened at 10:00 A.M. on Saturday, April 2, 1977, in the McNair Auditorium at Francis Marion College in Florence, South Carolina. Some seventy-five members and guests of the Association were present. President E. Thomas Crowson presided, and Joseph T. Stukes, chairman of the history department at Francis Marion, welcomed the group.

Carlanna L. Hendrick of Francis Marion presided over the morning session, "The End of Reconstruction." Robert J. Moore, Columbia College, read a paper on "Governor Daniel H. Chamberlain and the End of Reconstruction in South Carolina," followed by a paper by Richard M. Gergel, Duke University Law School, entitled, "Wade Hampton and the Rise of One-Party Racial Orthodoxy in South Carolina." Carol R. Bleser, Colgate University, and Lewis P. Jones, Wofford College, commented on its papers. There was a lengthy discussion afterwards.

The luncheon was held in the Smith Campus Center, at 1:00 P.M. The annual business meeting followed the meal. Carlanna Hendrick presented the nominations which were elected by acclamation.

President: Richard Gannaway (USC-Lancaster)

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The secretary-treasurer made the annual financial report, and the president announced the following meeting places of the Association: Wofford (1978), Clemson (1979). Following the business session Professor Dan T. Carter of Emory University delivered an address, "Fateful Legacy: White Southerners and the Dilemma of Emancipation."

Robert K. Ackerman presided over the afternoon session in McNair Auditorium, "Editing and Editorial Projects — The State of the Art in South Carolina." W. Edwin Hemphill, retiring editor, presented an assessment of "The Calhoun Papers," and George C. Rogers, Jr., University of South Carolina, explored avenues of research opened by the publication of "The Laurens Papers."

Following the afternoon session, members of the Association enjoyed a social hour. Dinner was served at 6:00 P.M. after which Warren W. Hassler, Jr., Pennsylvania State University, spoke on "Some Unfinished Historiographical Business of the War Between the States."

A. V. Huff, Jr.
Secretary-Treasurer

WADE HAMPTON AND THE RISE OF ONE PARTY RACIAL ORTHODOXY IN SOUTH CAROLINA

Richard Mark Gergel

The Redemption Era in South Carolina politics, extending from the end of Reconstruction in 1876 to the rise of Tillmanism in 1890, has been remembered as a period of stability under the moderate patrician leadership of Wade Hampton. While occasional historians have asserted a reservation or two about the quality of Hampton's leadership, a general consensus has been achieved to the effect that white South Carolinians were able to restore their political supremacy while providing opportunities for black participation and involvement in the exercise of power. This traditional view, however, falls impressively short of a reasonable characterization of race relations in South Carolina. Indeed, it would be more precise to say that white Democratic control of the government was attained through a violent overthrow of the Republican Party. Moreover, once the Hampton-led Democrats gained power, they immediately initiated efforts to make their ascendancy permanent. In the process, they amended the election laws so as to eliminate reasonable supervision of the polls by impartial or Republican observers; decreased dramatically the number of polling places in majority black districts; employed persistent policies to siphon off much of the local Republican leadership; and developed a unique "tissue paper" mode of ballot box stuffing to neutralize the state's black majority of voters. These methods were systematic, purposeful and conclusively effective. Wade Hampton's role was central.[1]

The mystique of patrician moderation, long a cornerstone of Southern historiography, today constitutes a secure part of a received cultural tradition. The emphasis on the racially moderate or "tolerant" approach of the Southern upper class has been contrasted in this tradition with the racism of the "redneck". A close examination reveals that such distinctions are not particularly helpful in understanding the bi-racial politics of South Carolina of the late 1870's. There exists a need to focus less upon the nuances in the political rhetoric and manners of white politicians and more on the effects of their acts on Southern blacks. But before this matter may be pursued, the towering political presence of Hampton, the very symbol of Southern racial civility, needs to be carefully reviewed.

* * * * *

Wade Hampton III, a scion of one of nineteenth century America's great family fortunes, spent the first half of his life managing his vast holdings of prime cotton land and slaves. As secessionist passions grew throughout the South in late 1859, Hampton took his first step into the limelight by publicly attacking a proposal to reopen the African slave trade, then before the South Carolina General Assembly. Hampton realized that the drift toward secession and eventual war with the Union could in the long run only damage the interests of his class, and his speech was designed to cool secessionist tensions in the South while placating abolitionist feelings in the North. Though his ideas were warmly received in the North, Hampton was bitterly denounced throughout the South. Once the War began, however, Hampton immediately established and financed his own military unit, and eventually rose to the rank of Lieutenant General in the Confederate Army.[2]

Rising from the War a local hero, Hampton quickly plunged into the uncertain politics of post-war South Carolina. At the time, some Radical congressmen were seriously discussing universal male suffrage as a method of insuring the continued viability of the Republican Party once the nation was reunited. Hampton realized that a moderate policy of suffrage, with an educational qualification, would weaken the Radical plan while not significantly affecting the traditional balance of power in South Carolina. He believed that the former slaves would follow the dictates of their previous masters, and thereby reinforce the political base of the aristocracy. Instead of following Hampton, however, the South Carolina General Assembly passed one of the South's most punitive Black Codes, which pushed the U. S. Congress toward universal suffrage. As the Radical-sponsored Reconstruction Acts neared approval in the national Congress, Hampton vigorously opposed them, both as chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee and as a private citizen.[3]

Once the Reconstruction methods became law, however, Hampton encouraged his fellow South Carolinians to accept them, and began making efforts to "direct the negro vote." Hampton believed it was absolutely necessary to control the black vote because "now we are fighting for bread and life, and a desperate battle we are waging. . . . The revolution is not ended."[4]

Events moved too quickly for Hampton and his followers. The Republican Party was able to consolidate the State's black majority into the most potent political force in South Carolina. The Republican-controlled State Constitutional Convention drew up a new constitution in 1868 that provided for universal male suffrage, guaranteed civil rights for all, and created a public educational system. As State Democratic Executive Committee Chairman, Hampton and several others sent a bitter note to Congress denouncing the new constitution. They claimed the result of the new document would be that:

> Intelligence, virtue, and patriotism are to give place, in all elections, to ignorance, stupidity, and vice. The superior race is to be made subservient to the inferior.

Hampton and the others concluded that they would continue to fight for the white people of the State "until we have regained the heritage of political control handed down to us by our honored ancestry."[5]

As the Republicans firmly settled into control of the South Carolina government, Hampton, now virtually impoverished, was forced to remove himself from active participation in public affairs and to dedicate his energies to bankruptcy proceedings instituted against him in three states. Meanwhile, a small significant core of whites — led by Generals Martin Whitherspoon Gary and M. C. Butler and participating in such organizations as the Democratic Party and the Taxpayer's League — never gave up hope of returning to power, even in the heyday of Radical rule. Their moment came in 1876, and was signaled by the tumultuous overthrow of the Republican Party by whites in Mississippi the previous year. Gary, Butler and their associates decided that the Mississippi model proved the utility of a judicious use of fraud, violence and intimidation. Like a military tactician, Gary began planning the campaign of '76.

Gary's proposal, which eventually came to be known variously as the "Mississippi Plan" and "Edgefield Plan," sought to unite the State's white minority and destroy the political organization of the black community. The plan called for the creation of Democratic Military Clubs "armed with rifles and pistols and such other arms as they may command." It required that each Democrat control the vote of one black "by intimidation, purchase, (or) keeping him away. . ."; recommended that Democrats disrupt all Republican meetings and demand "division of time"; and outlined a strategy for ballot box stuffing in case the need arose. Gary invited political allies to his Edgefield County home and shared with them his proposal.[6]

The Gary system was not easily implemented, for black political rights were guaranteed in law and subject to specific protection through Federal intervention. As a result, South Carolina Redeemers faced the tactical need to run a campaign of terror and fraud while at the same time publicly appearing to be participating in a legitimate political process. The Democrats associated with the "Edgefield Plan" were alert to the danger of the reinstitution of Federal military rule should a violent uprising by whites appear to be taking place. It was in meeting this latter hazard that Wade Hampton was to prove himself most useful to the cause of Redemption.

In June of 1876, Hampton visited the state from his home in Mississippi. Appreciating the personal dimension that he could add to the campaign, Gary explained his plan to Hampton and asked him if he would accept the Democratic nomination for governor. Hampton readily accepted the offer.

The canvass was designed on two levels — one orchestrated by Hampton and the other by Gary — to deal with the dual problems of the campaign's image in the North and the permanent threat to Democratic control posed by the state's overwhelming black majority. Visible on one level was the pageantry of Hampton's tour across the State, described by one supporter as a campaign to "arouse the white population to secession or nullification madness." A corollary purpose, made necessary by the sheer numerical realities of race, centered on bringing as many black voters as possible into the Democracy. Moderate statements on the race issue by Hampton constituted the cornerstone of this latter approach. Meanwhile, Gary and Butler implemented a campaign of terror and intimidation designed either to push black voters into the Democratic column or to keep them home on election day. The Democratic canvass closely followed Gary's original plan. The most prominent ingredient consisted of two hundred and ninety rifle clubs with eighteen thousand members. This force succeeded in massively disrupting the Republican campaign effort. Violence, intimidation, and even random murders were commonplace in the final weeks of the campaign.[7]

Election day was characterized by Democratic intimidation, repeat voting, and ballot box stuffing. On the face of the returns Hampton defeated incumbent Republican Governor Chamberlain 92,261 to 91,127. Two formerly Republican counties, Laurens and Edgefield (Gary's home), gave Hampton heavy majorities, but only by voting five thousand more men than lived in the two counties. Both parties contested various county results and each claimed victory. A monumental struggle promptly ensued and eventually dual governments were proclaimed, complete with two governors and two legislatures. The five-month battle for legitimacy was finally won in April, 1877 by Hampton and the Democrats as part of the Compromise of 1877.[8]

* * * * *

Terror had brought white rule, but scarcely white hegemony — as convincingly demonstrated by the close balance of Democratic and Republican Party strength implicit in the returns of 1876. Thus a crucial task remained unaddressed: if white redemption was to be permanently inculcated into the political culture of South Carolina, this relative balance of party strength had to be fundamentally altered.

The struggle for power by the Democrats therefore moved from the terrain of electoral politics to the more complex level of negotiation and internal infighting. Gary's control of the situation, so visibly evident during the canvass itself, dwindled as Hampton asserted his leadership over the movement. Gary was on the outside as Hampton consolidated his hold on the state political apparatus, while at the same time negotiating secretly with Rutherford B. Hayes. Only one of many actors in the electoral campaign, Hampton moved his government into the State House in April of 1877 with full control over the Redemption movement.

Once in office, the Hamptonians moved quickly to consolidate their executive and legislative power. First, Hampton demanded the resignation of all legally elected Republican state officials and fortified the edict by ordering that their offices be padlocked. The Governor contended that the Republicans had won their elections by fraud. All factions understood that the pro-Democratic Supreme Court would uphold the Governor's order, and the resignations were soon forthcoming.[9]

Simultaneously, the Hamptonians moved to alter the balance of power in the House. Originally, sixty Republicans had won election to the House in 1876, compared to sixty-four Democrats. The Democratically controlled House agreed to accept the election of only thirty-seven of the Republican representatives, unseating twenty-three others. The greatest source of the purging was the seventeen-member Republican delegation from Charleston, whose seats "were arbitrarily declared vacant."[10]

To further weaken Republican influence, Hampton carefully used his patronage power to bring various opposition leaders into the Democratic fold. Working in close conjunction with local legislative delegations, Hampton co-opted many Republican officials, black and white, by appointing and reappointing them to various patronage positions. Given the acute agricultural depression in the South in 1877, the power of local patronage can scarcely be underestimated.

The Hampton patronage policy was aimed primarily at counties with black majorities and strong Republican organizations. For instance, Georgetown County, which was eighty-five per cent black, had ten blacks selected out of thirty-seven appointments during Hampton's gubernatorial term. On the other hand, Greenville, with a black population of thirty-three per cent, had just one black selected out of fifty-one county appointees. In some counties there appeared to be a conscious effort to reappoint the sitting Republican officials, as a method of co-opting the local leadership. Further, a substantial portion of the appointments were timed to coincide with either the five month period in which the Hampton and Chamberlain governments were struggling for power or during the final months before Hampton's 1878 re-election bid. It is important to note that after 1878 when the Republican Party was no longer a political force in the state the Democrats were far less generous with their patronage positions.[11]

Another technique used by the Hamptonians to undercut local Republican strength was the nomination of black Democrats for offices in overwhelmingly majority black counties. This policy was pushed strongly by Hampton, particularly in the nomination of three black Democrats in a special election in Charleston in 1877. Between 1876 and 1890 at least one, and as many as six, black Democrats sat in the South Carolina House, all representing counties with black votes exceeding sixty-five per cent.[12]

Though the purging of Republican executive and legislative officeholders and the shrewd utilization of patronage assured the Democrats of firm control over state government for the moment, a truly permanent hegemony required fundamental manipulation of the electoral process to neutralize the voting power of the state's substantial black majority. The centerpiece of the Democrat's strategy was a bill introduced by Senator Gary that decreased the number of voting precincts in low country counties — with heavy black majorities — and separated the legal status of federal and state election procedures. In the process. the "low road" and "high road" approaches of Gary and Hampton in 1876 were combined in a single concrete and decisive effort at suffrage restriction in 1878.

The decrease in the number of polling places in areas of concentrated Republican strength was intended to force voters to walk ten to twenty-five miles to cast their ballots. No precincts were left in thickly-populated black townships, and in some counties polling places were so dramatically decreased that it was impossible for all the blacks to vote within the time allotted on election day. The second section of the Gary bill, calling for separate places for federal and state boxes, was designed to prevent federal supervisors from observing balloting procedures for state offices. Thus, the supervisors would be able to report on fraud only in regard to federal elections. The Gary bill sailed through the House and Senate in votes that went almost entirely along party lines. On March 22, 1878, Governor Hampton signed the act into law.[13]

To culminate the Redeemer's electoral "reconstruction," Hampton moved forcefully to prevent any Republican supervision of balloting procedures. First, in contravention of state law, Hampton refused to appoint, with a few exceptions, Republicans to county Boards of Canvassers. In their stead, the Governor appointed pliant black Democrats. The Boards were responsible for both supervision of the election returns and selection of poll managers. To be assured that the Redeemers' strategy of an unsupervised ballot was extended all the way down to the precinct level, State Democratic Party Chairman John Kennedy instructed his county chairmen, by secret memorandum, to inform their Boards of Canvassers to "appoint **proper** managers — all **Democrats.**" (emphasis in the original).[14]

As the election of 1878 neared, Hampton reached the zenith of his power. Fully in control both of his party and of the state's electoral machinery, Hampton was prepared to begin his final campaign to destroy the Republican Party as a significant political force. Since his dubious victory of 1876, the Governor had been able to siphon off a significant portion of the Republican leadership, while neutralizing much of the remaining threat through suffrage law alterations. At the Democrat's state convention in July 1878, Hampton was renominated and the moderate platform of 1876 was reconfirmed. Hampton and other party leaders were emphatic on their point of calling both races to the Democratic fold.

But beyond the public fanfare of good faith and fair play, the Democrats renewed their low-road efforts once again. In late August, State Democratic Party Chairman Kennedy sent a secret memorandum to his local chairmen outlining the campaign of 1878. He urged each chairman to run an "aggressive, but not violent" campaign that included "divisions of time" at all Republican meetings. Kennedy told the chairmen to have "a great show of men on horseback" and other such actions "as will impress the minds of our opponents with our settled and unwavering determination to carry the election." As in Gary's 1876 plan, each white Democrat was instructed to control the vote of one black, and in counties where it was "judicious" chairmen were urged to enroll Negroes as members. In regard to ballot box stuffing, Kennedy instructed the local chairmen to do anything "that will swell our vote," but urged them to "try to stop all boasting of counting in. Let our motto be 'Still waters run deep'." As mentioned earlier, Kennedy instructed all chairmen to make sure only Democrats were appointed as polling officials. Finally, Kennedy ordered the chairmen to destroy his letter, and to "leave nothing undone to carry your county."[15]

Meanwhile, the Republican Party, torn by dissension, weakened by Hampton's patronage policies, fearful of Democratic violence, and powerless to avert the frauds of the Party of Redemption, began its organizing effort for the campaign by deciding not to nominate a statewide ticket. The party, which had polled over ninety thousand votes just two years earlier, was in August 1878 a weakened structure ready to crumble. The Republican platform, the convention's only channel for its anger and frustration after two years of Hampton rule, constituted a scathing attack upon the Redemption government. It castigated the Democrats for the violence and frauds of the 1876 campaign and the ensuing special elections; attacked the Redeemers for their policy of "division of time," which disrupted the Republican canvass because of the fear of violence; accused the Democrats of unseating rightfully elected Republicans to swell the ranks of the dominant party; and criticized the Hamptonian Legislature for passing the electoral law changes which decreased the number of precincts in predominantly Republican areas. Instead of pursuing state offices, the Republican Party of South Carolina — in a desperate effort to avoid complete destruction — decided to concentrate only on its local races.[16]

* * * * *

Hampton's campaign of 1878 was, therefore, no mere electoral canvass — it was an effort to end for all time the meaningful participation of the Republican Party in the democratic process of South Carolina government. Hampton's 1876 tone, full of moderation and conciliation, shifted in 1878. First, he declared that because of the continued presence of the Republican Party, South Carolinians were "not yet free." Drawing the parameters of the political terrain very narrowly, Hampton argued that there was no place in the Palmetto State's politics for any white man except in the Democratic Party. With ominous clarity, Hampton informed blacks that any race which "placed itself in opposition (to the white race) . . . must give way before the advancing tide and die out as the Indians have done. . . . It is the law of God. . . ." In another speech, Hampton firmly warned blacks that if they continued, what he called, "drawing the color line," then "they would be drawing it for their own destruction." The Governor offered blacks an end to the violence and intimidation if they would join the Democratic Party. As the Hampton organ, the Charleston **News and Courier**, put the options: "if the negro does not vote with the Democratic Party, he must not vote at all."[17]

In conjunction with the strict "Democratic only" campaign of Hampton, a systematic strategy of violence and intimidation was initiated, at least in part, by State Adjutant General Moise. Instead of organizing into semi-secret rifle clubs, the Democratic military clubs were made part of the state militia. Indeed, the local militias were ordered to meet to organize at the same times and places as the Democratic county ratification conventions. A school teacher in Beaufort County described the canvass: "political times are simply frightful. Men are shot at, hounded down, trapped, and held to (sic) certain meetings are over, and intimidated in every way possible." A Democratic newspaper in the same county stated: "In order to prevent our county falling into such hands (the Republican Party), **any** measures that will accomplish the end will be justifiable, **however wicked** they might be in other communities."[18] (Emphasis in the original.)

With virtually no supervision at the polls, election day provided the Democrats with the opportunity to demonstrate the utility of the new legal sanctions for ballot-box stuffing. A state law provided that when the total ballots cast at any box exceeded the number of electors recorded as voting, then the excess ballots would be removed. The law stated that poll managers — now almost all Democrats — would reach into the ballot box, and blindfolded, remove excess votes. The Democrats printed up prior to the election tissue-thin ballots, which were far smaller and of a different texture than the standard paper ballots. Democrats, in preparing to vote, would, as one eyewitness described:

> . . . fold as many (tissue ballots) as they saw fit in a regular ballot, and passing the latter into the narrow aperture of the padlocked tinbox, a quick tap, as it rested in the slit, drove it and dislodged the little ballots, which then had the appearance of having been legally cast.[19]

Once the polls were closed and the votes were counted, the managers would place the ballots back into the boxes and withdraw the excess. In "correcting" this excess vote, the blindfolded judges, guided by the tissue ballots, demonstrated a remarkable ability to remove only Republican ballots. The widespread use of this technique would, according to the **New York Times**, "stagger belief." In the Second Congressional District, where no Republican served as an election official, nine out of every ten boxes had an "overflow." One precinct had an excess vote of over 2,500.[20]

The result was a decisive victory for the Democrats. The balance of power, originally very close in 1876 — seventy-eight Republicans in the General Assembly compared to seventy-nine Democrats — shifted to one-hundred and fifty Democrats and only eight Republicans in 1878. At the local level, where the nearly sixty per cent black majority apparently stayed loyal to the Republican Party, the Democrats managed to win nineteen thousand more votes than the Republicans.[21]

Hampton readily conceded the existence of terror and fraud in his 1878 election, blaming the violence on "the terrible moral obliquity visited on our people by Radical rule. . . ." On the floor of the United States Senate he again acknowledged the illegal activities, but defended the actions of his campaign by contending that "it was a case where the very civilization, the property, the life of the State itself, were involved."[22]

The 1878 election resulted in the utter destruction of the Republican Party in South Carolina. The violence, the ballot box stuffing, the manipulation of election laws and the abandonment of the state organization by the national party all contributed to its demise. The Republican Party continued to meet, biennially limping along as a patronage clique, but never ran another major race in South Carolina as a party that carried the hopes of the freedmen.[23]

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The canvass of 1878 indicated that a thoroughly united white community, left to its own devices and undisturbed by the possibility of federal intervention, could subvert the voting power of the state's black majority with considerable effectiveness. The chapter of black aspiration was seemingly closed — certainly as long as whites were content to vote en masse under patrician leadership. But the sheer poverty of the state insured that the great mass of the white electorate would someday strive to express its own aspirations. Such a schism within Democratic ranks would inevitably push the white dissenters into a coalition with their impoverished black neighbors. When this time came — with the Greenbacker movement in 1882 and the agrarian insurgency of the early nineties — the Democrats moved step-by-step toward permanent legal disenfranchisement.

Thus, Hamptonian politics provided the most significant contribution to the political culture of South Carolina between the Civil War and the civil rights movement. By defining the ends and offering the means to achieve them, Wade Hampton gave to South Carolina the one-party racial orthodoxy that shaped the politics of the State for the next nine decades.[24]

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[1] The near-Olympian moral position achieved by Southern conservatives as a result of historical literature growing out of the mature Dunning tradition of Reconstruction came under telling assault in a pioneering essay by C. Vann Woodward, "Bourbonism in Georgia," **North Carolina Historical Review, XVI** (January, 1939), pp. 23-35, written in 1938. Woodward's theme has been subsequently pursued by Joel Williamson, **After Slavery: the Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861-77** (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1965); Williamson, Joel, **Origins of Segregation,** (Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath, 1968); and to a lesser extent, by Francis Simpkins in hi studies of Pitchfork Ben Tillman. The reputation of Wade Hampton — one of the primary bases of the historical assumption about "patrician moderation" — has survived these revisionist studies. Modern scholarship necessarily builds upon the pioneering work of these men.

[2] G. G. Vest, "A Senator of Two Republics," **Saturday Evening Post,** February 20, 1904, p. 8; David Duncan Wallace, **The History of South Carolina** (New York: American Historical Association, 1934), Volume III, p. 158; Alexander K. McClune, **Recollections of Half a Century** (Salem, Mass.: Salem Press Company, 1902), p. 407; William Arthur Sheppard, **Red Shirts Remembered** (Atlanta: Ruralist Press, Inc., 1940), pp. 85-88.

[3] W. E. B. DuBois, **Black Reconstruction** (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), p. 412; Wallace, Volume III, pp. 237, 254-55; Alfred M. Waddell, "An Address Delivered to the Colored People By Their Request at the Wilmington Theatre" (Wilmington: 26 July 1865), pp. 3-11. Hampton sent a letter to Waddell in 1865 informing him that the Wilmington speech was an exact statement of his feelings. Letter in the Alfred M. Waddell Papers, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[4] Letter from Wade Hampton, 31 March 1867, Wade Hampton Papers, South Caroliniana Library.

[5] Wade Hampton and Others, "The Respectful Remonstrance on Behalf of the White People of South Carolina, Against the Constitution of the Late Convention of the State, Now Submitted to Congress for Ratification," (Columbia: 1868), pp. 6, 12. For a background on Republican rule in South Carolina during Reconstruction, see: Joel Williamson, **After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861-77** (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1965); Peggy Lamson, **The Glorious Failure: Black Congressman Robert Elliott and Reconstruction in South Carolina** (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1963); Henry Allen Bullock, **A History of Negro Education in the South** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 56.

[6] Martin W. Gary Papers, South Caroliniana Library, "Division of Time," was a Democratic campaign technique in which armed men on horseback would attend Republican rallies and demand an equal portion of the speaking time, in an effort to intimidate the attendants.

[7] Paul Leland Haworth, **The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Election of 1876** (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company), p. 136; Hampton Jarrell, **Wade Hampton and the Negro: The Road Not Taken** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), pp. 59-60; Francis B. Simkins and Robert Hilliard Woody, **South Carolina During Reconstruction** (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932), p. 335; "A South Carolinian," "The Poltical Condition of South Carolina," **Atlantic Monthly**, 1877, pp. 177-94; Lamson, p. 245; Edward Maxwell, "Hampton's Campaign in South Carolina, **The South Atlantic**, 1878, p. 422; **Appletons Annual Cyclopedia**, Volume XVI (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1886), p. 720; **South Carolina in 1876: Testimony as to the Denial of the Elective Franchise in South Carolina at the Elections of 1875 and 1876**, Volume 1727, p. 233; and Francis B. Simkins, "The Election of 1876 in South Carolina," **The South Atlantic Quarterly**, 1922, p. 336.

[8] Haworth, p. 145; **South Carolina in 1876**, Volume 1729, p. 578; Lamson, p. 265; and C. Vann Woodward, **Reunion and Reaction** (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1951), pp. 19, 32, 147, 219-20.

[9] **New York Times**, 15 April 1877; "A South Carolinian," "The Result in South Carolina," **Atlantic Monthly**, January, 1878, p. 3; and George Brown Tindall, **South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), p. 17. Included among the Republican resignations were those of Lt. Governor R. H. Gleaver, Attorney General Robert Brown Elliott and Secretary of State Henry E. Hayne.

[10] Tindall, pp. 16-17; **New York Times**, 4 June 1877, Charleston **News and Courier**, 31 May, 1 June 1877. As a result of the refusal to seat the Charleston delegation, a special election was held and through massive ballot box stuffing and terror, the Democrats overcame a previous Republican majority of 6,000 votes. Hampton later admitted that the Democrats stuffed as many as 5,000 ballots in that special election. **Cong. Record**, 46th Cong., 2nd Session, p. 3755.

[11] Hampton Appointment Book and Subject File, South Carolina Archives; William J. Cooper, **The Conservative Regime** (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 34, 88. Hampton appointed 117 blacks to positions out of a total of 1,400 selections.

[12] Tindall, p. 23; Hampton Subject File, South Carolina Archives.

[13] **Senate Journal of South Carolina, 1877-78,** p. 20 of Index; **New York Times,** 26 October 1878; Wallace, Volume III, p. 325; Tindall, p. 68; Cooper, p. 94; Alruthens Ambush Taylor, **The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction** (Washington: The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1924), pp. 290-91; J. Morgan Kousser, **The Shaping of Southern Politics** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 50; and James Welch Patton, "The Republican Party in South Carolina, 1876-95," **Essays in Southern History,** Melvin Fletcher Green, Editor (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 103. The significant role of election laws is not to be underestimated. J. Morgan Krousser, in his valuable new book, **The Shaping of Southern Politics,** says: "Election laws and procedures did, in themselves, have very substantial impacts on both the scope of political participation and the mode of political activity in the South," Kousser, p. 5.

[14] **New York Times,** 26 October, 16 November 1878; Patton, p. 103; Robert Smalls, "Election Methods in the South," **North American Review,** 1890, p. 594; Letter from John D. Kennedy to McCall, Marlboro County Democratic Chairman, 23 August 1878, McCall Papers, South Caroliniana Library. As an example of Hampton's policy of circumventing the requirement that he appoint Republicans to Boards of Canvassers, the Governor appointed a black in Horry County as the minority representative, even though he was running as a Democrat for office in that very election.

[15] **News and Courier,** 29 July 1878; **New York Times,** 18 October 1878; Tindall, p. 29; and Letter from Kennedy to McCall, McCall Papers, South Caroliniana Library.

[16] **News and Courier,** 6, 9 August 1878; Tindall, pp. 31-32.

[17] **New York Times,** 8 April, 24 August, 27 September (quoting the **News and Courier**) 31 October 1878; **News and Courier,** 3 October 1878; Cooper, p. 96.

[18] **New York Times,** 27 October 1878; Rupert S. Holland, **Letter and Diary of Laura M. Towne** (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1912), pp. 288-89.

[19] Edward Hogan, "South Carolina Today," **The International Review,** February 1880, p. 114; Patton, pp. 108-09.

[20] **New York Times,** 8, 11, 29 November 1878; Cooper, 94-95. The heavy reliance on the **New York Times** is due to the absence of any local opposition press. The **New York Times** had a correspondent in South Carolina during the election.

[21] **New York Times,** 15, 30 November 1878; Tindall, p. 41. The results from South Carolina and several other southern states were so obviously fraudulent that they forced President Hayes to admit that his "reconciliation policy" was "a failure." Stanley Hirshon, **Farewell to the Bloody Shirt** (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1967), pp. 49-50.

[22] **Yorkville Enquirer,** 23 January 1879; **Congressional Record,** 47th Congress, Special Session, p. 373.

[23] Patton, pp. 95-111; Tindall, pp. 43-44.

[24] Tindall, pp. 50-51; A. A. Taylor, p. 292; Patton, pp. 104-06; Kousser, pp. 17-18, 27, 49, 92; **New York Times,** 2 January 1882; Harold Stine, "The Agrarian Revolt in South Carolina: Ben Tillman and the Farmer's Alliance," Unpublished Senior Honors Thesis, Duke University, 1974. See also Lawrence Goodwyn's definitive new work, **Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

GOVERNOR CHAMBERLAIN AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION

Robert J. Moore

It was circus day in Columbia and the parade was the main attraction that morning of April 11, 1877. Hardly anyone noticed a pale, bald, handsome man trudge from the State House for the last time. As Daniel H. Chamberlain climbed into his carriage and slowly made his lonely way down crowded Richardson Street (now Main Street) to his home on Richland Street, there was neither jeering nor cheering to mark his going.[1] He had been the hope of the Republican Party of South Carolina and the dilemma of the National Republican Party in the last few months, but now it was all over. The drama of Reconstruction closed with undramatic compliance by Southern Republicans to the nation's loss of will to enforce majority rule in South Carolina.

Thus ended Reconstruction in the Palmetto State. It had been the era of pillage and plunder and imposition of barbarism over civilization — or the era of the noble experiment in bi-racial democracy replacing a white slaveholding aristocracy. Which of these it was depended on whether one rejoiced with the triumphant Wade Hampton or mourned with the crestfallen Daniel Chamberlain.

Chamberlain did not fit the stereotype of a "Carpetbagger." He was born on a Massachusetts farm, the eighth of nine children. The family had a scholarly bent; three finished college and the youngest, Leander, became a nationally prominent Presbyterian clergyman. Daniel graduated from Yale in 1862 with high academic and oratorical honors. President Woolsey proclaimed him "a born leader of men." His abolitionist attitudes led him to leave Harvard Law School after only one year to become an officer in a Negro regiment. Though he didn't resume his formal studies, he maintained a lifelong interest in the classics and spiced his high-flown oratory with Latin and Greek phrases. He was a quiet, scholarly intellectual with polished manners who found much that was distasteful in political life. His dignified bearing and personal courage forced grudging admiration from upper crust South Carolinians.[2] But the circumstances of Reconstruction cast him in the role of leader of the masses rather than the oligarchs and made him untrustworthy in the eyes of the latter.

However, the Governor's goal of disarming white opposition to the Republican Party enjoyed considerable success for a time. He received numerous commendations for his efforts.[3] His fiscal conservatism and his leadership against corruption and incompetence within his party, though perhaps motivated less by moral indignation than by ultimate party interest, almost captured the support of a significant portion of white Carolinians. He won the admiration of Francis W. Dawson and his editorial support, for a season, in the influential **News and Courier.** In July of 1876, South Carolina's most widely read newspaper ran a two-week series of lengthy articles spelling out the accomplishments of the Chamberlain administration and urging fellow Democrats to support the reform Governor for re-election. Dawson argued that, since Negro voters outnumbered whites by about 30,000, the only way a Democratic candidate could win the Governor's seat would be through a massive campaign of intimidation and fraud.[4]

This argument became well known. What was not so openly known was that Chamberlain had been working to gain the confidence of major Charleston businessmen. Such an alliance between reform Republicans and business-oriented Democrats would claim a broad middle ground in South Carolina politics that would be hard to beat. The outlines of this discreet movement toward accommodation emerge in the mutually appreciative correspondence between Chamberlain and Dawson.[5] Had the only issues been honesty and competency, the alliance might have worked, with far-reaching effects on Southern history. But the everpresent issue of race intervened. While Dawson tried to persuade fellow Democrats that Chamberlain was their best bet, racial antagonism boiled over and dissolved his efforts.

First, there were strikes of the rice field workers in Beaufort and Colleton counties. Chamberlain's even-handed law enforcement and refusal to deal harshly with the strikers reminded planters that the state government was not their tool. Far more dramatic and important in setting Democratic minds on going "Straight-Out" was the Hamburg Massacre. This July clash left six blacks and one white dead, and in its wake Governor Chamberlain put the President on notice that troops might be needed to maintain order. The action was interpreted as anti-white by most Democrats who had held back from the "Straight-Out," full Democratic campaign advocated by Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary. How can a white man, they reasoned, be trusted when he doesn't take the side of whites in a racial confrontation? The nomination of Wade Hampton, who returned in 1876 from his second home in Mississippi, was assured and the "Red Shirt Campaign" geared up. Even Dawson deserted his grand plan and threw the full weight of the **News and Courier** into the bitter and desperate struggle to oust the "carpetbaggers," "scalawags," and "nigras."

The question of who actually won the election of 1876 in unanswerable. There is ample documentation of widespread intimidation and fraud, especially on the part of Democrats, who were absolutely determined to overcome the black majority. Much of the "bulldozing" was admitted both at the time and in subsequent accounts by Democratic participants and observers.[6] The intriguing story is not who should have been elected but how Chamberlain was skillfully maneuvered out of power.

In the months following the election of 1876 South Carolinians were treated to the spectacle of a dual government with all the anxiety, disorder, and danger that suggests. Both Chamberlain and Hampton were sworn in as governor and tried to perform the functions of the office. Two Houses of Representatives claimed legitimacy, one loyal to "Governor" Hampton, the other to "Governor" Chamberlain, and neither was able to legislate effectively.

The situation was extremely dangerous. Republicans were in particular peril because Hampton's Red Shirts held the preponderance of armed strength in the state. Chamberlain's health suffered under the strain of the anxiety and his wife lived in perpetual fear of his assassination.[7]

Two factors prevented open fighting and the immediate overthrow of the Republican administration. One was Hampton's strategy of force without violence. He restrained his seething supporters from the violence which would have invited large-scale intervention by the federal government. The second factor was the presence of United States troops. There were only a few hundred soldiers in South Carolina, but they were the key to the survival of Chamberlain's government. A detachment took control of the State House on the night before the Legislature convened and remained in occupation throughout the four-month period of dual government.

United States troops in the State House brought a storm of protest and controversy. E. L. Godkin, whose journal had turned against Reconstruction long before, characterized the occupation of the State House as unprecedented, unconstitutional, and revolutionary.[8] Chamberlain defended the action as legal, necessary, and proper under the circumstances.[9]

The impact of the dual government on private individuals was striking. Acute anxiety and confusion were the main symptoms. The letters received in Chamberlain's office were filled with expressions of fear and requests for help. Citizens complained of being driven from the land they had rented and farmed for years. Some were physically abused; others were ordered to leave the state. The loss of jobs was the most common complaint. The nearly illiterate letter written by C. S. Belton of Anderson sums up the anguish of many. ". . . we is in a Bade condition" begins the touching letter; then it catalogues the problems — Democrats won't hire you if you voted Republican; doctors make you pay before treatment if you voted Republican; lawyers won't take your case before a trial justice if you voted Republican. He concludes: "som of us sees hard time just because we voted for you."[10] Chamberlain's usual reply expressed his sympathy with their plight and his inability to help. He hoped when the new President was chosen peace and protection might be restored.[11]

Republican local officials suffered some of the same anxiety. There was dual office holding and conflicting allegiances right down to the grassroots local level. In January 1877, Hampton informed Chamberlain's appointees by a printed form letter of removal from office and proceeded to appoint his own officials. In any particular locality there was a question of which officials had authority to enforce the law, make arrests, release prisoners on bond, and collect taxes. Chamberlain received numerous inquiries from officials about how to handle these conflicts. Citizens were also insistent on knowing to which county treasurer they should pay their taxes and to which trial justices they should swear out warrants against offenders. In some instances, Democrats physically took over offices, pushed the Republican claimant out, and established Hampton's man. W. J. Mixson, a trial justice from Barnwell County, informed Chamberlain that whites were breaking into the homes of blacks and beating people, but they would not submit to arrest by a Republican official.[12]

He needed help in law enforcement, but Chamberlain had no help to give. This powerlessness to enforce the law contributed to the Republican's loss of credibility and his downfall. One can sense in the Chamberlain papers and letterbooks a sweeping away of confidence and a spreading recognition of impending doom.[13] The papers of Wade Hampton evoke an opposite feeling — and for good reason. His star was rising. His policy of force without overt violence was paying off.

Four factors were fundamental to the decline and fall of Daniel H. Chamberlain and Reconstruction in South Carolina. Three were local and one was national. First among local factors was money. Hampton had the support of the men of property in the state and he used their financial assistance to oil the gearing up of his administration while the Republican apparatus choked in the dust of empty coffers. On December 21, 1876, the business and professional elite of Charleston, many of whom had sought cooperation with Chamberlain a few months before, met at Hibernian Hall and resolved to pay taxes only to a Hampton government. "Charleston and the sedate Conservatives were finishing loyally with the 'red hots,' Straight-outs and Red Shirts in the middle and up country had begun."[14]

On January 8, 1877, mass meetings were held in at least sixteen counties and endorsed Hampton's request that taxpayers voluntarily submit to his government a portion of their tax liability so that he might have money o operate on.[15] Checks began to arrive directly in Hampton's office within three days and $120,000 had poured in by March.[16] Hampton thus was able to pay officials and support state agencies that would recognize the legitimacy of his administration. For example, the Lunatic Asylum ran out of funds and the Superintendent, Dr. J. E. Ensor, had the alternatives of releasing the inmates, leaving them interned but unattended, or turning to Hampton for funds. He turned to Hampton.[17]

In contrast, Chamberlain's government had no funds and only a trickle of money coming in. To add insult to penury, the Democrats obtained a Supreme Court injunction in December to prevent any state funds being withdrawn from the banks used as depositories.[18] This was an empty gesture as the bank accounts were also empty.

But this empty gesture was symbolic of the second local factor of major importance — Chamberlain's lack of support from the state courts. After both men won lower court decisions on who had proper authority Hampton won a Supreme Court judgment on his authority to pardon one Tilda Norris. An extraordinary set of circumstances surrounded the case. The Court was composed of Franklin J. Moses. Sr. and A. J. Willard, both Republicans who had become sympathetic to Hampton, and J. J. Wright, a black Republican. During the proceedings Judge Moses became fatally ill and the deliberations were left to Willard and Wright. Willard's position was known and powerful pressures were placed on Wright. He first signed the release order after dire warnings from Democrats but later repudiated the act after receiving brotherly advice from Robert Brown Elliott. Finally, on March 2, Judge Willard took the bull by the horns, ordered the release of Tilda Norris, and thus recognized the legitimacy of Wade Hampton as governor.[19]

The courts were making legitimate what the majority of white people in the state were bound and determined to see happen. This absolute determination was a third fundamental factor in the fall of Chamberlain and the triumph of the Democrats. Hampton, himself, showed the way. On the evening after Chamberlain was inaugurated by his friends, Hampton told his cheering admirers: "The people have elected me Governor, and, by the Eternal God, I will be Governor or we shall have a military governor."[20] A Chester County trial justice quoted Judge T. J. Mackey as declaring that "if the Federal Authorities attempt to seat Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Chamberlain will be destroyed, and I would be the first in that event, to give the word."[21] Hampton reorganized the militia, with the Red Shirt rifle clubs being commissioned as units in the new force.[22] "The certainty that thousands of Red Shirts would converge on Columbia if

Hampton gave the word was a potent factor in all negotiations. . . ."[23] The threat of violence was ever present to chill the ardor of Chamberlain supporters and fire the enthusiasm of Hampton partisans.

At least two writers friendly to Hampton were convinced that he would have led his followers in rebellion against the United States had the dispute not been resolved in his favor. When President Hayes interviewed Hampton in March he asked what South Carolinians would do if Chamberlain were confirmed as Governor. Hampton replied "that the first thing would be that every Republican tax collector in the state should be hanged within twenty-four hours."[24] White Carolinians held overt violence to a fairly low level in deference to Hampton's judgment on the proper strategy. They perceived their condition as so desperate under Republican rule that they were ready to do whatever their leader thought necessary to win.

In the face of this dogged determination, backed by armed strength, court decisions, and the propertied interests, the only possible salvation for Chamberlain was active support by an equally determined federal government. But the government at Washington was in only slightly less disarray than the government of South Carolina. Grant was a lame-duck President and the dispute over the presidential election was not settled until two days before the March 4 inaugural date.

Had Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic contender, been triumphant, Chamberlain was positive his Republican government would be allowed to perish. However, he nourished some hope that if Rutherford B. Hayes emerged the victor, South Carolina Republicans might be sustained. But Hayes was not inclined to be of any assistance to Chamberlain. His personal temperament, desire for sectional conciliation, reading of Northern public opinion, constitutional reservations, and the implied promises employed in winning recognition as president — all militated against Hayes attempting to restore the atrophied Republican administration in South Carolina. Precipitating a head-on test of power and endurance against the iron-willed and fanatically determined majority of white Southerners would promote not peace but continued strife. Nor would it be in the long-range interest of the Republican Party in the South, which, in order to survive and flourish, would have to attract white men "of substance." Nor would such a use of federal power be tolerated by Northern voters whose enthusiasm for reforming the South and guaranteeing political equality of the races had waned. Thus reasoned President Hayes, who confided to his diary: "Both Houses of Congress and the public opinion of the Country are plainly against the use of the army to uphold either claimant to the State Government in case of a contest."[25]

After his inauguration, Hayes went through the motions of deliberating on the matter; interviewing rival governors and seeking the counsel of his cabinet. But probably the decision was already made, the bargain already struck. In late December Hayes had been impressed by a visit from Judge T. J. Mackey of Chester, South Carolina, who pressed Hampton's claims and delivered a letter from the would-be governor. Hayes recorded the visit as "The political event of the week. . . . Mackey is a fluent and florid talker. His representations are such as lead me to hope for good results by a wise policy in the South."[26] On the day Hayes was inaugurated, Senator Stanley Matthews, a fellow Ohioan and close confidant of the President, wrote to Chamberlain suggesting that he agree to withdrawal of federal support of his claim "for the sake of the peace of the community . . ." and, he might have added, for the relief of the new President. William M. Evarts, Secretary of State-designate, added a postscript to Matthews' letter which seemed to endorse the idea (though he later denied he intended endorsement). The letter, which issued from the spirit of the famous Wormley Hotel agreement. was a crushing blow to any lingering hopes Chamberlain may have retained. As an added insult, the letter was delivered by a special messenger — none other than Colonel A. C. Haskell, Chairman of the South Carolina Democratic Committee! Chamberlain found the suggestion that he abdicate "embarrassing beyond endurance." In his reply he contended that there were better means "to conciliate and pacify the South" than "to permit Hampton to reap the fruits of a campaign of murder and fraud."[27]

Although Chamberlain must have realized that the decision had already been made to abandon him, he accepted when the President asked him in late March to come to Washington to confer on how best to end the dispute. He arrived on March 27 and during the next two or three days he had long conversations with the President, cabinet members, and others. Chamberlain told Hayes that removal of the troops would result in the practical resolution of the dispute in favor of the opposition, without regard to legal claims and would leave loyal Republican citizens defenseless against the illegal Democratic military organization.[28]

Hampton, also summoned to Washington, gave the President his promise to "secure to every citizen, the lowest as well as the highest, black as well as white, full and equal protection in the enjoyment of all his rights under the Constitution of the United States."[29] This pledge was justification enough for Hayes and the cabinet. On April 2, 1877, the cabinet unanimously recommended that the troops be withdrawn on grounds that no rioting or civil disturbances existed to justify occupation of a seat of government.[30]

Chamberlain traveled to New York City before making the lonely return to South Carolina. For Hampton the train trip home was a triumphal procession ending with greeting by a huge crowd in Columbia. Music for the occasion was provided by a United States Army band! The rejoicing of the white minority knew no bounds. April 11, the day the Governor's office changed hands, was a beautiful spring day. It was an omen for some that Carolina was now to have a new birth. A newspaper advertisement adjacent to the article describing the transition urged people to paint their houses and make them clean and bright in keeping with the brighter times ahead with Hampton.[32]

But the final letters Chamberlain received as governor struck a somber note. A trial justice wrote: If President Hayes abandons you "he leaves the col'd people in the hands of their oppressors without the ability of perpetuating their freedom. And he has taken upon himself a fearful responsibility."[33] A fellow carpetbagger wrote: "A few days ago, a colored man said to me — 'To think that Hayes could 'go back on us' now, when we had to wade through blood to help place him where he now is.' It was only then, that the full force of our position struck me. . . .[34]

How Americans interpret the Reconstruction is more important than how they interpret most events because that interpretation affects public policy concerning race, role of government, and the relationship of states to the federal government. Daniel H. Chamberlain's own interpretation of Reconstruction and his fall from power went through an evolutionary process and ended up exactly 180 degrees from his defensive statements of 1877. On the day the troops evacuated the State House, Chamberlain declared in his farewell message to the Republicans of South Carolina that "by order of the President whom your votes alone rescued from overwhelming defeat, the Government of the United States abandons you, deliberately withdraws from you its support, with the full knowledge that the lawful Government of the State will be speedily overthrown."[35]

On July 4, 1877, in a lengthy holiday oration at Woodstock, Connecticut, he became much more emphatic in his denounciation of "the cowardice and treachery of President Hayes' Southern policy." It was "unconstitutional and revolutionary, subversive of constitutional guarantees, and false to every dictate of political honor, public justice, and good morals."[36]

Privately, however, Chamberlain admitted to his friend, William Lloyd Garrison, that his ouster was inevitable, given the circumstances. Three factors were most important. First, "the uneducated negro was too weak, no matter what his numbers, to cope with the whites." Second, "We had lost . . . the sympathy of the North, in some large measure, though we never deserved it so certainly as in 1876 in South Carolina."

Third, the disputed presidential election caused "the defeated Republicans under Hayes to sell us out."[37]

Nearly two years after his defeat, Chamberlain published in the **North American Review** a resounding defense of Negro suffrage and attacked the Social Darwinist position (though he didn't use the term) that the very overthrow of the Negro-supported governments proves blacks are not capable of self-government and thus do not deserve to participate in government. "Such conclusions are as illogical as they are immoral." The right to vote and exercise political power are "totally independent of the power or wealth or education of the voter."[38]

Nothing seems to illustrate more clearly the rising tide of white supremacy ideology and Social Darwinism than the fact that by 1890 Governor Chamberlain himself was swept along with it. There were also personal factors that affected the metamorphysis of his public views on race and states rights and Reconstruction. As a highly successful New York lawyer he had become a political independent in the 1880's and usually supported Democratic candidates for President. In addition, he spent considerable spans of time again in South Carolina, acting as receiver for a bankrupt railroad. (He renewed his friendship and maintained correspondence with Francis W. Dawson.)[39] He circulated in the "best" circles of society and came to a greater appreciation of Southern gentlemen.

By the 1890's, about the only portion of his previous interpretation that remained intact was his conviction that Hayes had deserted Southern Republicans **"in order to save the Presidency for the Republican Party. . . ."** In a clever and eloquent speech before a cheering audience in Boston in 1890, he declared that the federal government must let the Negroes alone to work out their own destiny and to protect their own rights. Their constitutional rights are the same as those of whites and their political freedom will come as they learn how "to use and assert those rights."[40] This is the same argument he had labeled "illogical" and "immoral" in 1879.

In 1901, Chamberlain wrote an article for an important series in **Atlantic Monthly** reassessing Reconstruction. He declared Republican Reconstruction policy to have been a grievous mistake which was motivated largely by blind partisanship and less by misguided philanthropy. He had come to the conclusion that his reform faction could not have brought good honest government to South Carolina even if allowed to continue in office. There had been too much dishonesty, too much ignorance, too much incompetence to overcome. Furthermore, Reconstruction efforts to help Negroes had been harmful to them. They should be allowed to develop on their own to greater proficiency in those simple manual tasks which are their lot as established by decree from a higher being."[41]

Southern whites found great delight and comfort in Chamberlain's conversion to their view. Nothing so confirms conviction as to have the antagonist won over. And the white South's triumph was almost complete by 1901. Scientists had presented evidence that supported popular racial prejudices. The Supreme Court had converted the 14th amendment into a bulwark of protection for corporations and had placed its stamp of approval on racial segregation. The President and Congress had acquiesced in the disfranchisement and segregation of Negroes in Southern states. The nation had accepted what William A. Dunning had approvingly called "The Undoing of Reconstruction." And historians, led by Dunning and John W. Burgess of Columbia University, were joining Daniel H. Chamberlain in accepting the essential Southern story of Reconstruction.

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[1] Charleston **News and Courier,** April 12, 1877; F. A. Porcher, "The Last Chapters in the History of Reconstruction in South Carolina," **Southern Historical Society Papers,** Vol. XIII: 83-85.

[2] James Green, "Personal Recollections of Hon. Daniel H. Chamberlain, Ex-Governor of South Carolina," **Proceedings of the Worcester Society of Antiquity,** (1908): 257-269; Walter Allen, **Governor Chamberlain's Administration in South Carolina: A Chapter of Reconstruction of the Southern States** (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888), pp. 524-526; Charleston **News and Courier,** June 5, 1876.

[3] Governor Daniel H. Chamberlain's Papers, South Carolina Archives, Columbia (cited hereafter as Chamberlain Papers), **passim.**

[4] Charleston **News and Courier,** May 30, July 5-18, 1876.

[5] Francis Warrington Dawson Papers, Duke University Library.

[6] See especially Henry T. Thompson, **Ousting the Carpetbagger from South Carolina** (Columbia: R. L. Bryan Company, 1926), pp. 115-116, 129; Alfred B. Williams, **Hampton and his Red Shirts: South Carolina's Deliverance in 1876** (Charleston: Walker, Evans & Cogswell Company, 1935), pp. 365-366; Senator B. R. Tillman, "The Struggles of '76: Address Delivered at the Red Shirt Reunion, Anderson, S. C., August 25th, 1909," pp. 26-39; Chamberlain Papers, Aug.-Nov., 1876; Narcisa Gonzales to Grandmother, Aug. 19, 1876, Elliott-Gonzales Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

[7] Allen, p. 466; Green, p. 264.

[8] **The Nation,** XXIII (Dec. 7, 1876): 337; XXIV (Jan. 4, 1877): 4.

[9] Allen, pp. 442-444.

[10] Feb. 20, 1877, Chamberlain Papers.

[11] General Letters, Governor Daniel H. Chamberlain, South Carolina Archives (cited hereafter as Chamberlain Letterbooks).

[12] Jan. 4, 1877, Chamberlain Papers.

[13] In January he exhorted appointees to hold their offices and perform their duties. In March he advised them to wait and see what would happen.

[14] Williams, p. 429; Charleston **News and Courier,** Dec. 22, 1876.

[15] **Ibid.,** Jan. 9, 1877; Williams, p. 434.

[16] Porcher, XIII: 74.

[17] Williams, pp. 426-427.

[18] Charleston **News and Courier,** Dec. 9, 1876.

[19] New York **Times,** March 2, 1877; Porcher, XIII: 72-74; Williams, p. 440; Francis Butler Simkins and Robert Hilliard Woody, **South Carolina During Reconstruction** (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1932), pp. 533-534.

[20] Charleston **News and Courier,** Dec. 8, 1876.

[21] Adam R. Sloan to Chamberlain, Feb. 24, 1877, Chamberlain Papers.

[22] Porcher, XIII: 74.

[23] Hampton M. Jarrell, **Wade Hampton and the Negro: The Road Not Taken** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949), p. 105.

[24] Williams, p. 446; Jarrell, p. 104.

[25] T. Harry Williams, **Hayes: The Diary of a President 1875-1881** (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1964), (cited hereafter as Hayes Diary), Feb. 25, 1877, pp. 76-77; March 23, 1877, p. 85. For discussions of the lack of national will or of Republican Party will to enforce reconstruction policy in 1877 see: Vincent P. De-Santis, **Republicans Face the Southern Question — The New Departure Years, 1877-1897** (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 24-65; James McPherson, **The Abolitionist Legacy From Reconstruction to the NAACP** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 35-52, 81-94; Rayford W. Logan, **The Betrayal of the Negro From Rutherford B. Hayes to Woodrow Wilson** (New York: Collier Books, 1965), pp. 29-30; Eli Ginsberg and Alfred S. Eichner, **The Troublesome Presence: American Democracy and the Negro** (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 178-188, 232-234; Harry Barnard, **Rutherford B. Hayes And His America** (New York Press: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1954), pp. 268-269; Kenneth E. Davison, **The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes** (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 142-143; Keith Ian Polokoff, **The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction** (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), ch. 7; Stanley P. Hirshon, **Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro, 1877-1893** (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 28-33; New York **Times,** April 3, 1877; **The Nation, XXIII** (Dec. 28, 1876): 376.

[26] Hayes Diary, December 30, 1876, 61-62.

[27] Allen, pp. 469-471; New York **Times,** March 8, 1877.

[28] Allen, pp. 472-477; New York **Times,** March 28, 29, 30, 31, April 3, 1877.

[29] Hampton to Hayes, March 31, 1876; New York **Times,** April 4, 1877.

[32] Columbia **Daily Register,** April 12, 1877.

[30] New York **Times,** April 3, 1877.

[31] Williams, pp. 444-445.

[33] W. J. Mixson to Chamberlain, April (n.d.), 1877, Chamberlain Papers.

[34] William T. Rodenbach to Chamberlain, April 8, 1877, **Ibid.**

[35] Allen, p. 481.

[36] **Ibid.,** p. 519.

[37] Chamberlain to William Lloyd Garrison, June 11, 1877; Allen, 504-505.

[38] **North American Review,** February, 1879, 172.

[39] Green, pp. 264-265; Correspondence in Dawson Papers, Duke University Library, gives indication many more letters must have passed between the two.

[40] D. H. Chamberlain, "Dependent Pension Bills; and the Race Problem at the South," speech before the Massachusetts Reform Club, February 8, 1890 (pamphlet at South Caroliniana Library).

[41] Daniel H. Chamberlain, "Reconstruction in South Carolina," **The Atlantic Monthly,** LXXXVII (April, 1901), 473-484; see also: Chamberlain, "Limitations of Freedom," Address before Northwestern University at Commencement, June 11, 1896 (pamphlet at South Caroliniana Library); Chamberlain, "Present Phases of Our So-Called Negro Problem," Charleston **News and Courier,** August 1, 1904; Chamberlain to J. C. Hemphill, June 30, 1904, Hemphill Papers, Duke University Library.

THE CALHOUN PAPERS PROJECT: ONE EDITOR'S VALEDICTORY

(An Address to the South Carolina Historical Association, April 2, 1977)

By W. Edwin Hemphill

Let me place the project for the publication of the papers of John C. Calhoun in a perspective of which I have been acutely conscious through eighteen years. Not much more than 150 years ago Napoleon Bonaparte inquired, "What is history but fable agreed upon?" As if in rebellion against that cynical definition of history, mid-nineteenth century Germans began to develop a more nearly scientific school of history, emphasizing critical examination of textual sources. Their goal was to tell the story of history as its events actually happened. Their new ideals and methodology were transplanted across the Atlantic Ocean, and history as a distinct academic discipline can be said to have been born in The Johns Hopkins University barely a century ago under the parentage of Herbert Baxter Adams. The very first doctoral degree in history to be awarded in the United States was bestowed by The Hopkins in 1882 upon J. Franklin Jameson. He died, after an extremely useful career, in 1937, the year in which I received my doctorate and only a year or two after his path and mine had coincided in one or two academic conventions, notably that of the American Historical Association in Providence, Rhode Island, in 1936, in which he and I were enrolled as founding members of the Society of American Archivists.

Adams, Jameson, and their pioneering colleagues felt from the first a need to gain access to reliable documents, to authentic primary source materials, as the **Sine qua non** of the new kind of history that they advocated. They learned promptly that they could not rely upon the published editions of basic documents that were available to them. Textual atrocities had been committed, despite generally good intentions, by such well-known editors as Ebenezer Hazard, Peter Force, and Jared Sparks. So these bowdlerizers' more discriminating followers launched a search for documents and attempted to respect with rigid standards what the written word — the manuscripts — revealed. Adams delved, among other sources, into the prolific writings of Thomas Jefferson. Jameson became the first comprehensive editor of John C. Calhoun's letters. That edition of the "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun" was published by the then still infant American Historical Association as part of its **Annual Report** for the year 1899.

Jameson's "Preface" reveals repeatedly that he sought to attain not merely the verisimilitude but indeed the actuality of truth, essentially all of the available truth, and nothing but the truth. He struggled to decipher with total accuracy Calhoun's notoriously illegible handwriting — depths of illegibility that resulted, I believe, from the fact that Calhoun's hand and pen could not keep pace with the quickness of his mind. Jameson misspelled in the Calhoun manner Calhoun's erroneous words — "sperit," for example — and reproduced with few changes Calhoun's ungrammatical punctuation, plurals, and pronouns.

Moreover, Jameson labored valiantly to discover and to include in his edition manuscripts that had never previously been brought out of hiding places. He sought manuscripts and transcriptions from autograph collectors and dealers, from research institutions, and from two major United States government departments; and he was able to obtain a hundred or more documents from almost twoscore individuals, including some of Calhoun's grandchildren and descendants of Calhoun's associates. We can be doubly grateful for these efforts by Jameson, because he published either transcriptions of or extracts from a considerable number of manuscripts that seem to have been lost within the past seventy years.

In other respects as well, the issuance of Calhoun's correspondence by the most productive editor of the first three decades of our century was a landmark. His compilation consisted of 1,218 pages. It included more than 500 letters written by Calhoun and almost 200 written to him. The majority of these was made available to Jameson by the newborn Clemson Agricultural College, a brainchild of Calhoun's son-in-law, Thomas Green Clemson, and of none other than the sometimes despised Benjamin R. Tillman. In the 1890's microfilm cameras and Xerox machines were not yet gleams in the eyes of any inventor. So Clemson College did a remarkably generous, risky thing. It shipped the whole mass of its Calhoun manuscripts, approaching 3,000 documents, to Jameson at Brown University in Rhode Island, on loan for an indefinitely long interval, for his convenience in studying them and in selecting what he would publish. Both Jameson, who was to become probably the most skillful editor of the next quarter-century, and Clemson University as well deserve much gratitude for the merits of the edition of the Calhoun papers that was published in 1900. And there is a poignancy in the fact that Jameson datelined the "Preface" to his sample of modern editorial techniques — a "Preface" that can be considered to be one of the more significant essays in American historiography — precisely fifty years after the day of Calhoun's death in 1850.

Nevertheless, praiseworthy though it was, the Jameson edition came to be outmoded. To its values a new generation of historians that began to flourish about 1940 demanded the addition of other virtues. And I suspect that Dr. Jameson, if he could have lived to attain the age of 120 years with full possession of the sharp keenness of his faculties, would be among the first of us to applaud. Indicative of the need for a more nearly complete edition is the fact that all of the three most recent, major biographies of Calhoun — those by Gerald Capers, Margaret Coit, and Charles Wiltse — were written without their authors having done substantial research in the National Archives, although all three were published after that institution began on a small scale to make its treasures available.

The publication in 1950 of Volume I of native South Carolinian Julian P. Boyd's highly critical and interpretive edition of **The Papers of Thomas Jefferson** sparked a productive movement in American historiography that is still in progress. Dr. Boyd's edition of the Virginian's early writings was acclaimed by the public in general and by President Harry F. Truman in particular. Emboldened by such encouragement, a moribund nonentity created before Dr. Jameson's death, the National Historical Publications Commission (recently enlarged into the National Historical Publications and Records Commission) began a search for other subjects and for other editors. Another native of South Carolina, Philip M. Hamer, who had been for about fifteen years associated with the National Archives and was directing the Commission, visited the University of South Carolina in the spring of 1952. He conferred with his friend Robert L. Meriwether — and with such others as State Archivist J. Harold Easterby. Quite promptly and most informally — without a single tangible assurance of new financial support but with admirable faith — the present project was initiated under Dr. Meriwether's leadership twenty-five springs ago. About a week later, by similar methods but with better financial prospects, the University of Kentucky launched its edition of **The Papers of Henry Clay.** From such small, uncertain beginnings have grown the aggregation of **Papers** projects of today that numbers about twoscore in the letterpress form and about 200 in microfilm and microfiche editions. Their letterpress products alone more than quintuple Dr. Eliot's five-foot shelf of books. Some of them, like Dr. Eliot's selections, are classics.

Dr. Meriwether lived to see most of Volume I of **The Papers of John C. Calhoun** develop into galley proofs. It covered Calhoun's young manhood and his six years of service in the United States House of Representatives, 1811-1817. I was attracted from a career as a Virginia historian, about the beginning of 1959, to succeed to the editorship and to help Dr. Meriwether's associates, such as E. L. Inabinett and Clara Mae Jacobs, press that volume to posthumous publication, in Dr. Meriwether's name, in the early autumn of 1959. As Dr. Jameson traced his interest in Calhoun to a provocative passage in the Hermann Vo nHolst biography of Calhoun, I consider it to have been a blessing that an inability to obtain employment one summer during my graduate studies freed me to read copiously in our nation's constitutional history and in the states' rights writings of such men as Thomas Jefferson, Calhoun, Alexander H. Stephens, and Jefferson Davis.

Dr. Meriwether did more than to bring to near-completion the pioneer book of the Calhoun project. He assembled and accessioned in the South Caroliniana Library of the University of South Carolina photocopies of an estimated 25,000 letters written by and to Calhoun. These were obtained from about 200 institutions and from about seventy-five individuals. They multiplied roughly fivefold the previously known body of Calhoun documentation. Yet it can be confessed, candidly, that neither Phil Hamer nor Bob Meriwether nor Ed Hemphill nor anyone else had any adequate conception in 1959 how incomplete the collection then was. I never dreamed that in every calendar month throughout the past eighteen years I would be able to accession newly discovered Calhoun documents. The collection now includes an estimated 70,000 versions or more of an estimated 50,000 distinct documents. (To pause to count them would be a waste of time.) An accession file that comprised thirty half-filled five-inch by three-inch trays has swelled to ninety such trays that are reasonably well filled. And the end of our acquisitions, which add a distinctive spice and zest to the drudgery of editorial labors, is not yet in sight.

Indeed, that end may never loom into view — not when one considers the vagaries inherent in the preservation and migrations of manuscripts, the fact that one bit of learning leads to another, and what Calhoun, using one of his favorite nouns, would call the inevitable "hazards" of professional progress. Even so, one of the two initial goals has already been attained. The University of South Carolina has become, without question or quibble, the world's chief center for Calhoun research and a principal one in what it offers for investigations of the "middle" or ante-bellum period of United States history. And it is a source of satisfaction to me that I, in contrast with my counterparts in a dozen or more similar projects, have been able to maintain an open-door policy in the office, welcoming all researchers who seek occasionally the privilege of using its photocopies.

The second goal envisioned by the founders of the project has been about half-attained. This objective was to publish a reasonably complete and reliable edition of Calhoun's papers — an edition that will stand the test of time. Volume IX was published last spring. It carried Calhoun's career over the formidable "hump" of the South Carolinian's heavily documented service as Secretary of War, 1817-1825. In contrast with Dr. Jameson's 1,218 pages, these nine volumes comprise a total of more than 7,500 pages.

To be issued about one month hence is Volume X, which covers

Calhoun's four years as Vice-President under John Quincy Adams. Volume XI bids fair to be published in 1978 and is intended to carry Calhoun's chronology through 1832, when he resigned the second-ranking office in the land under President Andrew Jackson, in order to become a United States Senator. If my hopes are fulfilled, when I retire from the editorship on June 30, I shall leave to my successor an almost complete draft for Volume XII. That draft may assist in setting a pattern for treatment in print of Calhoun's countless speeches and remarks on the floor of the United States Senate. Calhoun's assertions to that audience are the dominant feature of his final eighteen years.

Moreover, I shall leave in the office typescripts of abstracts and transcriptions of fully ninety per cent of all of its photo-copies to the day of Calhoun's death. That observation prompts a statement of one of the lessons that my experience has taught me. Editorial progress should always be made far in advance of the more immediate, more urgent schedule for current publication. This is true because an editor finds to be infinitely useful the hindsights, the correlations and contrasts, that he can derive from knowing not only what he will publish next but also what lies ahead of his present position. To be an editor, as I see the trade, is to be not so much an authority as a learner. The thrill of new discoveries, of unprecedented explorations, of introducing to the scholarly world relevant materials that no one else has ever bothered to utilize — this is perhaps the chief charm that atones for many an hour of merely mechanical labors and of boring necessities.

Friends ask — sometimes out of genuine interest, sometimes because of sympathy — what I think of Calhoun after having spent so many years with the written record left behind him. This is no time for comprehensive, profound analyses of my opinions of that enigmatic man. Even if this were a proper occasion, I would not have the last word. But a few impressions may intrigue you briefly.

How do I rank Calhoun as an American political philosopher? Second. I accord to Thomas Jefferson top place, because in his creative, constitution-writing generation he led in formulating many an ideal and many an agency for democratic self-government. In Calhoun's less innovative generation there was opportunity only to divert the course of the ship of state when it was being steered toward rocks. Freedom from monarchy was a blessing, but democracy involved one inherent fallacy. Few men, if any, have ever labored so constantly and so logically to provide relief from the will of a potentially tyrannical majority.

Calhoun was frequently accused, in his own time, of being too metaphysical, too abstract and abstruse, too theoretical. He was not always so.

He was practical enough to walk through the Alleghenies in Pennsylvania in 1824 in order to see for himself whether or not the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal could cross that mountain barrier. He was practical enough to explore personally in the 1830's alternative routes through the Blue Ridge in North Carolina by which it might be possible to link Cincinnati with Charleston by rails — a feat that was actually accomplished long after his death. And he was practical enough in the same decade to encourage the establishment in Dahlonega, Georgia, of a branch of the United States Mint, in order that he and other producers of gold ore would not lose five per cent of its value as the cost of transporting it to Philadelphia to be converted into coins. Such rebuttals could be multiplied.

Was he fundamentally inconsistent, in that he seemed to be a nationalist until about 1830 and a sectionalist thereafter? Perhaps so. But I enjoyed presenting to a session of the American Historical Association in 1962 a thesis arguing that it was not so much Calhoun and his principles that changed as it was his reactions, his responses, to the changing environment of a nation that was being transformed by such innovations as the Industrial Revolution, the spoils system, and the growing predominance of the Northern states. Calhoun's heredity in respect to ideology, I suggested, was largely Jeffersonian, and he never abandoned its essential precepts. Only his environment changed. In the era of national youth and weakness, he strove with zealous patriotism to strengthen his country. When it became rather too strong, he labored with equal patriotism to save it from itself.

Bold he was at times and in some forums — brave enough to denounce President Andrew Jackson publicly as an "infatuated man." But shy and sensitive and inhibited by his personal code of proprieties Calhoun also was. He was urged for the Presidency in seven consecutive campaigns; but to run in the way that was coming to be expected of a candidate ran much against his grain. He avoided touring the nation, meeting voters, and speaking from the hustings as a forthright and even more as a disguised candidate. The office, he felt, should seek the man. Not even to attain a triumph of his principles would he seek the office openly. His reliance upon printed campaign propaganda, usually written by others and published anonymously, and upon the private correspondence of his friends was one of his most impractical failings. He never received the office.

No editor can divest himself completely of mankind's tendency toward hero worship. An opposite but not unrelated temptation is to select a **bete noire**, or even multiple enemies of his hero, upon whom to vent, at least in secret, his editorial spleen. One of the riddles that has sustained me throughout the past eighteen years is the question which of the following was really Calhoun's worst, most destructive enemy. Was that man Thomas Hart Benton, William H. Crawford, Andrew Jackson, or Martin Van Buren? Not having seen yet all of the evidence, I venture no final opinion.

It is fashionable — and justifiable — for us in the humanities to look with envy upon our seemingly more fortunate colleagues in the sciences. They get, we say, twenty or fifty or a hundred times as much money in federal and foundation grants to support their researches as do we. Even so, editors in such projects as the two here represented should feed with fright a heavy sense of responsibility for giving a dollar's value in return for every dollar received. This has been especially true of this editor, who remembers that his first wages were ten cents per hour and that his first semischolarly employment brought him a quarter per hour. Editing projects are admittedly quite costly, even when measured by the loose standards of our present, inflated currency. Roughly a million dollars have been spent so far in support of the Calhoun project. To print and bind each of our books is likely to cost much more than $12,500. Fully four times that figure is needed annually for the editorial office, which has long included one part-time employee and three full-time employees. The investment in manufacturing costs may be recovered in time, but income from sales can be slow in equaling the outlay, although our books can be found in research libraries, I believe, in all five of the continents. Among potential purchasers, some are prevented from buying, I think, by the simple fact that our books are guilty of telling people **more** than they want to know about Calhoun.

The project's staggering appetite for nourishment has been met through the years by seeking food from many different kitchens, always with the full, mutual knowledge of each of the cooperating chefs. The South Carolina Department of Archives and History has been practically from the first the editors' basic source of sustenance. The University of South Carolina has provided some of the staples from the very beginning. The University of South Carolina Press has almost toppled into bankruptcy, at times, under the weight of fulfilling its commitments to the Calhoun series and to other obligations. The University's South Caroliniana Society has given some financial support through eighteen years. The University's South Caroliniana Library has provided the dining room (our headquarters) and photocopies of newly acquired Calhoun documents through twenty-five years. And the National Historical Publications and Records Commission has never, as I recall, failed to grant every cent for which application has been made to nurture the editorial expenses and the publishing costs. The staff is grateful that it has been showered with its daily bread, although not often with generous desserts. To conclude use of the metaphor, I hope that present and future generations will rise up and call blessed the public-spirited, scholarly-minded benefactors who have never let the larder become empty. South Carolina deserves praise for having shouldered so unprotestingly chief responsibility for the maintenance of two expensive editorial projects. Many a wealthier state has not had the courage to make any commitment to one.

Some scholars tend to look down their noses, either with or without intellectual snobbery, upon editors. Such scholars view an editor's role as one comparable to that of a mere midwife. The best of modern historical editors serve, I might rebut, a more creative function. Their offspring attest the fact. And I might protest mildly that the editor of a large-scale project needs to display more versatile talents than does a midwife. It could go without saying that he should be, first of all, a scholar having broad general knowledge and a specialized expertise in his field. But consider also some of the other services that he is likely to be expected to perform. He will probably find himself laboring also, from time to time, as a grammarian and linguist, an essayist, an administrator and budget manager, a personnel officer, a public relations expert, an archivist, a librarian, a bibliographer, a reference librarian, a correspondent, a proofreader, an indexer, a book designer and a typographer involved in the techniques of printing and of the graphic arts, and a secondary sales and distribution manager. In few of these highly specialized capacities will he have the final word. But in all of them and in others — that of a copy editor, for example — he can earn respect for his wishes and judgment. Conversely, he should seek with open mind the insights of specialists and should yield often to their frequently superior experience.

Two qualities should rank high in an editor's personality and nature. One that I may be demonstrating quite badly this afternoon is humility, an always questioning tendency to doubt his own knowledge. Not only should he seek to learn from others and from the documents that are his stock in trade. He should also place himself in the seat of the scornful, so that he will be constantly on guard against the near-truth, the apparently but deceptively acceptable concept or spelling or other matter that is not in reality one hundred per cent true. An editor's other most desperately needed quality is patience, a dogged willingness to invest in his labors, unhurriedly despite his own eagerness and all outside pressures, that infinite attention to details that has often been defined as the hallmark of genius.

On balance, I am still enjoying the years that I have lived, so to speak, with the highly intellectual John Caldwell Calhoun. Never, even in the wake of an occasional setback, have I lost faith in the worth of the enormous effort. Not even once have I doubted that I have been privileged indeed, both professionally and personally. Nevertheless, quite voluntarily, I plan to leave "my" office, its typewriter and microfilm reader, and my companions in Calhoun's renewed march through his career. But I wish for my designated successor, Clyde N. Wilson, Jr., and his associates the very best of success, and I hope that I shall live long to enjoy vicariously the challenges of their labors and the yet-to-come fruits of what has been from the first a joint effort.

THE LAURENS PAPERS — HALF-WAY

By George C. Rogers, Jr.*

Historical editing is an important key to the study of history. It is the key which opens up many subjects for scholars which might remain hidden forever. This is one of the principal things that I have learned from editing the papers of Henry Laurens.

The first effort in editing is to put the documents back into the pattern in which they were generated. The massive job that Charles Lee has done at the Archives has been done under this guiding principle. Wilmarth Lewis, the editor of the Horace Walpole papers, has gone even further by reassembling the books as well as the letters of Horace Walpole. He reconstructed Walpole's Library on his estate in Connecticut (unlimited funds do help), discovered that Walpole had had each book numbered for a particular place in his room, has developed a sixth sense that, according to Andrew Oliver, permits him to walk into a second-hand bookstore, scan the shelves, spot a Walpole volume, ask the bookseller to remove the binding, and — voila — the special number. On walking down a London Street one day he came upon a house in which Walpole had lived and which was being demolished. He purchased the front door on the spot and placed it in the entrance to his Walpole Library. Thus each morning as he goes to work he enters through Walpole's door into a room where every book is in Walpole's designated place — and the room is now 80 per cent full. The reassembling is part of the fun.[1]

After President Harry Truman received the first volume of the Jefferson Papers, he asked the National Historical Publications Commission of which Philip Hamer was then the Executive Director, to draw up a list of names of the persons whose papers might be edited with value for the scholarly community. Among those names presented was that of Henry Laurens.

Upon his retirement in 1961 Dr. Hamer assumed the role of editor of the **Papers of Henry Laurens** with an office in the National Archives Building in Washington. As he had been the editor of the well-known Hamer **Guide to Manuscripts,** it was not difficult for him to survey the depositories throughout the United States for Laurens items. This search was continuing when in 1965 he asked me to join the project.

Our first job was to plan the volumes which we did with the assistance of the staff of the University of South Carolina Press. Philip was as much a bookman as he was an editor. He loved the feel of a well-made, handsome volume. Such scorn did he show for any book that once opened would not lie flat on the table! Only Meriden Gravure in Connecticut would be permitted to produce the color frontispieces — at least as long as Philip lived.

From 1965 to 1971 (the year of Dr. Hamer's death) we worked separately — Dr. Hamer in Washington; myself in Columbia. My job was to search in South Carolina, later in Portugal and in Great Britain. Searching is one of the aspects of our work that has almost come to an end. Did we do it scientifically? Could we have done a better and more rapid job? The search through the public records of South Carolina has been made progressively easy as our Archives produces more and more finding aids. We fortunately waited to exploit the papers of the Continental Congress in the National Archives until that institution produced a master index from which we have now secured a print-out of all Laurens items in that collection — some 1,200. The area in which we might have had more success much earlier is in the search for personal papers. We did compile a list of all the persons with whom Laurens corresponded, and we tried to find the papers of those individuals. The fact that Laurens corresponded with English merchants in Lisbon and Oporto did lead to a wine exporting firm in Oporto with success. But in this work one builds expertise and contacts which pay off in time. One great oversight was in not chasing down the papers of James Grant[2] much earlier. But Clan Grant has many homes and castles throughout northern Scotland, and the Scottish Record Office in 1966 had no control over such personal holdings. It was only in the summer of 1975 that I got into the Grant papers at Ballindalloch Castle in Banffshire and found over 50 Laurens letters, the largest collection of originals that we have unatticed, and, unfortunately, discovered too late, for some of these documents should have been included in volumes already published. But rationalizing the dilemma — I might say such a late find provides renewed vigor for our work.

As we move into the Revolutionary period we have additional ways of cross-checking our findings. We have exchanged lists of documents with the editors of the papers of Jonathan Trumbull, Nathanael Greene, Robert Morris, William Livingston, Lafayette, Franklin, Washington, etc. And in cooperation with the other editing projects we have had the autograph dealer catalogues, located at the American Antiquarian Society in Worcester, Massachusetts, searched. The catalogues often quote portions of documents which is an aid, but as those who collect often wish to remain anonymous it is difficult to find the present holder of such items. We have resorted to writing to autograph dealers asking them to send a letter to the purchaser and then hope that the purchaser will contact us. Last month a collector phoned from New York to say that he had a Laurens item and would share it with us. We are permitted to cite his collection but not the place where it is housed. This was the first time we have had success along that avenue of investigation.

At the moment I think we have reached the half-way point in our work. We intend to publish fifteen volumes — five have already appeared. The sixth is at the printer's. The seventh is virtually complete. I hope to finish the annotation of volumes eight and nine by September 1 — these volumes cover the English years of Laurens' life, 1771-1774. David Chesnutt, who has worked on the project since the publication of volume two and is now co-editor, has been working on volume ten since last September. With that volume we enter the Revolutionary years.

Have we been successful? I would like to consider this afternoon some of the new paths that we have opened for scholars. In doing so I would like to use as my theme a quotation from a recent review of volume five by Clarence L. Ver Steeg: "Scholars can take heart that in a time when the profession seems unsure of its goals and serious work in the sources is almost construed as whimsey, this sturdy volume, its predecessors and successors, will stand for all to use long after the current historical fashions have passed."[3] We are building for the future.

Editors have been warned against writing essays in their footnotes, but footnotes quite legitimately may lead to essays. I am therefore suggesting that it would now be possible to produce a book of essays which, although not building constructively, could in an impressionistic way give a feel for the commercial world of Charleston in the eighteenth century — the portrait of a Southern port.

My first essay would be a close analysis of the painting of the Charleston waterfront in 1773 by Thomas Leitch, a painting which I have just had the chance to scrutinize carefully at the Museum of Early Southern Decorative Arts in Winston-Salem, N. C. Two features are important for our study — the wharves which extend into the Cooper River from Gadsden's Great Wharf, beyond the north end of the city, down to Granville's Bastion and the buildings which stand on the west side of Bay Street facing the wharves and housing a wide variety of activities relating to the life of the port. The wharves are breastworks extending from Bay Street and are covered with sheds, stores, etc. In the McCrady Plats there is a silhouette drawing of a wharf which gives precise details of these structures. An account in the **Gazette** in June of 1770, describing the damage done by a tornado which raked the entire waterfront, identified all the wharves from north to south.[4] Henry Laurens himself provided a vivid account of the Christmas fire of 1770 in a letter to William Carter, captain of his vessel the **Flora**, which was long engaged in the triangular trade between Bristol, Philadelphia, and Charleston. "On Christmas Day a dreadful Fire broke out on (John) Champney's Wharf, which violently scorched and had like to have finished our elegant Exchange. All the Stores down as far as Colonel (Othniel) Beale's Pack House were consumed in two hours. If the Key of that Pack House had not luckily been lost, I should have lodged in it the day before, upwards of 700 pounds Sterlingvalue in Deer Skins, to the Loss of our Friends William Cowles & Co. (of Bristol). The Flames were rapid and dreadful, and for an Hour threaten'd the Distruction of all the Shiping, Wharves, Stores, and sumptuous Edifices, East, South, and West of them. But on a sudden the Wind seem'd to be providentially confined within a narrow Channel directly South, which enabled us to stop the Progress of the Fire in a right Line. Many Goods saved from the Flames were huddled into that Store, which you lodged the **Flora's** Remains of Beer and Cyder, and are still there in great Confusion which has prevented me from ascertaining the Quantity or removing them. I was nine Hours on my Feet and very bustling about that Fire which has made me limp a little more than I did when you were here."[5] When we read later that John Logan had a packhouse for his deerskins on Othniel Beale's wharf one begins to recreate a panorama of the commercial hustle and bustle.

An essay on the taverns of Charleston is needed. The lists of licenseholders which were published in the newspapers each year after being granted licenses on Easter Monday inform us of the taverns on the Bay. There were seventeen in 1769.[6] These were the rendezvous of sailors and sea captains, merchants and factors, places for transacting the busienss of the port. The Beefstake Club met at the sign of the Bacchus.[7] Will we ever know what transpired at their meetings? Of course, the Exchange, which was to be completed in 1771 and which dominates the Leitch painting, was at the very center of the Bay, providing the same function as the Royal Exchange in London which most Charleston merchants knew personally. Each merchant knew where to find the men "in the Bristol trade" or "in the Scotch trade." Suddenly one can see Charleston as a miniature London, particularly if one considers the alleys. We think of Tradd, Broad, and Queen streets leading from the Bay into the town as the principal thoroughfares, but we should not forget the alleys and even the passageways which led from the Bay. The list of taverns indicates that some of these were located on the alleys; one of these taverns (McCrady's) is being restored today. Alley life illustrates the compactness of the Charleston commercial world. I was struck by the fact that Laurens felt his sister-in-law Mrs. James Laurens would benefit from the change in air when she moved into his home in Ansonborough. How could a distance of not more than seven city blocks provide a change of air unless life itself was packed too closely in the city?

The merchant was the preeminent figure along the Bay. How rich were these merchants? Richard Waterhouse in his dissertation "South Carolina's Colonial Elite" has, I think, settled this question for us in a definite way.[8] Benjamin Smith's personal estate of 45,000 pounds sterling was the largest to be designated in the inventories recorded prior to the Revolution. I am quite certain that Gabriel Manigault had a larger fortune but he did not die until after the Revolution and the inventory of his estate therefore cannot be compared to Smith's. Henry Laurens was worth 30,000 pounds sterling when he sailed for London in 1771. Waterhouse found few estates in the 20 to 30,000 pounds sterling range, yet there were enough in the 10,000 to 20,000 pounds sterling and in the 5,000 to 10,000 pounds sterling to make a statement that there was no more wealthy community in mainland North America on the eve of the American Revolution than that to be found in South Carolina.

But we must divide the merchants into sub-groups, many of which are clearly identifiable. There was a small group of men at the top. They often assisted each other. Gabriel Manigault and John Savage were the central figures. They had traded together to the West Indies, but in the 1760's they were mainly living off the interest of their fortunes. They were the money lenders, the closest to the modern bankers. William Dillwyn perceived John Savage as "justly ranked among the first Characters in Charles Town. He is largely concerned in Trade and as far as I have ever heard with unblemished Honor."[9] Closely associated with Manigault and Savage were Benjamin and Thomas Smith, their sons Thomas Loughton Smith and Roger Smith, Miles Brewton, Henry and James Laurens, John and David Deas, William Hopton and his son John. These were the native born merchants who were most likely to become patriots. They emerge as a group in the first Charleston Chamber of Commerce in December 1773. John Savage was the president; Miles Brewton vice president; David Deas treasurer; and John Hopton secretary. While in London Henry Laurens covered a bill of exchange of the Deas brothers in order to secure their credit. That was the type of service which they were always willing to render each other. This group was comparable to the group who reorganized the Chamber of Commerce after the Revolution in 1785, and thus it had a continuing life although a shifting personnel.

Although the Quakers were a small group largely concerned in the Charleston-Philadelphia trade in wheat and beer, they can be pinned down by using William Dillwyn's journal in conjunction with the Laurens Papers. Dillwyn, a Philadelphia Quaker, visited Charleston in 1772 and recorded the names of all those with whom he attended the Quaker Meetings or with whom he walked and dined. Joseph Kershaw and Samuel Wyly of Camden and Joseph Wright of the Bush River congregation in the

Dutch Fork supped with Dillwyn. The Great Wagon Road from Philadelphia and the regular packet services along the coast joined Charleston by land and by sea with Philadelphia. But a Quaker network that rose above these in importance was represented by the owners of the **Ann,** the vessel at issue in the struggle over the Navigation Acts in 1768. The **Ann** was owned by William Fisher of Philadelphia, William Cowles of Bristol, and Henry Laurens of Charleston. Fisher and Cowles were Quakers.

An analysis of the celebrations in honor of the patron saints of England, Ireland, Wales, and Scotland identifies four ethnic groups. During the winter of 1770-1771 the **General Gazette** described the four celebrations. On March 1, the anniversary of St. David, the tutelary saint of Wales, was marked "by a Number of Ancient Britons, Gentlemen Natives of that Principality, or their Descendants."[10] On March 17, the anniversary of St. Patrick, a number of gentlemen had a "very elegant Entertainment at Mr. Dillon's Tavern."[11] On St. George's Day on April 23 not only did the members of the society have a banquet but they elected officers for the ensuing year: William Burrows, president; William Bampfield and Plowden Weston, wardens; Hopkin Price, treasurer; William Maxwell, secretary; and Joel Holmes and James Amos, stewards.[12] But the most elaborate ceremonies were reserved for the 42nd anniversary of the St. Andrew's Society on November 30 (1770): John Moultrie, president; John Burn, vice president; William Michie, assistant; David Deas, treasurer; James Brisbane, clerk. But on this occasion the **General Gazette** noted the presence of the lieutenant governor, members of His Majesty's Council, the speaker, several members of the assembly with many other gentlemen of distinction.[13] Such an analysis not only provides four groupings but marks off the importance of the Scots in the local mercantile community.

How close did the merchants live to their places of business? The merchants had their town houses in what was the old city, some living above their stores or opposite their wharves, but a sign of affluence was to have a country seat. We know that the first cousins Thomas Loughton Smith and Roger Smith, as soon as they had entered business purchased for themselves country seats up the Neck. Roger bought his uncle Benjamin's Accabee plantation; Thomas Loughton purchased The Retreat. The two plantations adjoined at the Quarter House. Out of town visitors were often entertained by the merchants at their country homes. Pelatiah Webster, whose 1765 journal provides a glimpse of life among the captains of slave trading vessels, described his visit to Benjamin Smith's Accabee;[14] William Dillwyn whom we have already seen moving among the members of the Charleston Quaker community was a guest at Thomas Smith of Broad Street's Bloom Hall Plantation at Goose Creek in 1772;[15] and Josiah Quincy who came to Charleston in 1773 with letters of introduction from

Abigail Adams's family to her Charleston cousins noted his visit to Thomas Loughton Smith's Retreat plantation.[16] In May 1770 when the Sons of Liberty called for a meeting under the Liberty Tree, the meeting was postponed two days from Saturday to Monday to allow gentlemen to attend from "their country seats." This was the meeting over which Henry Laurens himself presided and which decided not to abandon non-importation, just because Parliament had removed all but one of the Townshend duties.[17] The picture of the Sons of Liberty waiting for the merchants to come into town from the country gives a different vision of the Charleston mob.

Distinct from the merchants were the factors who marshaled the produce from the country on their own wharves or rented stores on the wharves of others. An essay on the factors would focus on the group that stood between the planters and the merchants. although their interest was tied more directly to that of the planters and thus was opposed to the merchants. Factors in my view tended to be sons of planters. There is evidence that factors with stores on the wharves at the north end of town drew their business from the planters up the Cooper and Wando Rivers while those with stores on wharves at the south end of town drew their produce from plantations to the southward of the city. Maurice and Edward Simons whose family home was on the Eastern Branch of the Cooper River were an example of the first group. George Livingston whose two sons were storekeepers in the Indian Land had his own stores on the wharf of his son-in-law John Champneys and was thus an example of the second group. Christopher Gadsden, of course, was the greatest of the country factors — a fact which supplies a key to understanding his patriotic stance.

There must soon be written an essay on each of the groups of tradesmen in the city of Charleston. This should be much easier to do in the near future in as much as the Museum of Early Southern Decorative Arts is now searching every newspaper published in the southeastern colonies and states down to the year 1820 for all information relating to each category of tradesmen. Thus more detailed and more analytical studies can be achieved than the pioneering studies of Milby Burton on the silversmiths and cabinet makers.[18] Perhaps one might begin with the coopers who are a recognizable entity. The province of Carolina from an early day had tried to put a Carolina stamp upon her produce. Thus there was a public system of inspection staffed by the packers who were elected each Easter Monday. The packers were almost without exception coopers. Packaging was a skill. Carolina rice must have soon earned great reknown for one still sees in the shops of the world "Carolina" rice when none is grown in Carolina today. The Laurens letters give the long story to secure recognition for Carolina indigo. Henry Laurens himself tried to win the medal for the culture of indigo from the London Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, but never did. It was only awarded once for mainland indigo and then to a planter from East Florida. Laurens hinted at influence rather than valid analysis in that award, but the positive program for achieving recognition for Carolina produce is indicative of the sophistication of the Charleston mercantile community.

This system of Charleston trade was largely underwritten by capital held in Britain. An example which illustrates the system is that of Richard Oswald who had amassed a huge fortune in Germany as an army contractor during the Seven Years War and of John Lewis Gervais whom Oswald sent out in 1764 to settle an upcountry plantation near Ninety-Six. Oswald supplied the capital for his former clerk, a Huguenot from Hanover. Gervais was not entirely successful as a planter and Oswald in order to help him pay off his debts established himself as a merchant consigned to him in 1772 and 1773 several cargoes of slaves. The commissions from the sale of the slaves would pay off Gervais' indebtedness to Oswald. John Nutt was a London merchant who obtained consignments for the various members of the Smith family over many decades, including that, perhaps not quite desirable one, of tea in 1773 for Roger Smith. The little boy in the portrait of Mrs. Roger Smith painted by George Romney in 1786 and recently acquired by Historic Charleston Foundation was named after John Nutt. What a wonderful subject these London merchants in the "Carolina trade" would make!

Another essay might deal with the shipbuilding industry at Hobcaw which lay directly east of Charleston at the point where the Wandow River joins the Cooper. There was a cluster of shipyards at Hobcaw which can be identified from existing plats. John Rose was the most successful shipwright, having accumulated a fortune of 30,000 pounds sterling before retirement. The logs of the British naval vessels on the Carolina station give details of the work accomplished in the refitting and maintenance of vessels. There was a shipbuilding boom in Carolina on the eve of the Revolution. The building of Henry Laurens' ship **Magna Charta** of 200 tons under the supervision of Richard Maitland (a captain long in the London-Charleston trade) at the yard of Begbie and Manson can be followed not only in the Laurens papers but also in the Laurens account book newly discovered in the library of the College of Charleston. When launched in November 1770, the **General Gazette** stated that it was "thought to be the finest Ship ever built in this Province, and compleatly finished with all her carved Work and Decorations in the most elegant Taste. There was a very numerous company of Ladies and Gentlemen, who partook of a cold Entertainment, and afterwards had a Ball."[19]

The history of the sloops and schooners that brought the produce to the Charleston market from the plantations must some day be examined. Laurens when he could not find enough naval stores in the hands of factors would send his schooners to Georgetown to pick up from his friends along Black River and Black Mingo swamp sufficient barrels of pitch and tar to top off the freight of a vessel. If one looks into volume five of the Laurens Papers one will see the day by day onslaught made upon this coasting trade after Daniel Moore's arrival as collector of the customs in the spring of 1767. If one understands that this trade was an integral part of the commercial network, one can see how the changes made by Parliament between 1763 and 1767 drew many besides the merchants — in fact, almost the entire commercial community — into opposition to Parliament.

I suggest just one more essay at this time — one on the black seamen who sailed as crew on many of these vessels. In 1789 there was published in London the story of Equiano or Gustavus Vasa, one of the very first biographies of a black man who had been snatched from Africa, sold in the new world, and made his way back across the Atlantic. Equiano had been in Charleston arriving on the **Prudence** in February 1765, witnessing the celebrations on the repeal of the Stamp Act, and sailing back to the West Indies later in the year. In his account appear Captain Doran and James Reid of Savannah, characters which appear in the Laurens papers — the two sets of documents do not fit like tongue and groove, but they fit.[20] Two black slaves do emerge from the Laurens letters as distinctly recognizable characters — Andrew Dross and Jemmy Holmes. They had at an early date been on a vessel of HL's which was taken by one notorious Captain Magnus Watson to Pensacola where he attempted to abscond with vessel and cargo. After Laurens recovered his schooner and crew, these two sailors later served on rice vessels which made the voyage to Cowes and a market, on one occasion being shipwrecked on the shores of Germany when on the way to Hamburgh. As this vessel touched at Cowes after the date of the famous Somersett decision, one wonders why these black seamen did not seek their freedom while in English ports. Laurens was in London during the spring of 1772 and followed the Somersett case closely. He was not amused. He had with him his man servant Scipio (who when in England wanted to be called Robert Laurens). Later we have evidence that Laurens assisted George Appleby (a former partner who had retired to Shropshire) in sending his man servant back to Carolina via Savannah. But this essay would not be complete if one did not assess the effect of these events upon the young John Laurens. We know that John Laurens more than any other South Carolinian thought of freeing the slaves during the American Revolution. He obviously got his first lessons in abolition in the context I am describing. His very close London friend Thomas Day — so close a friend that Day composed the epitaph for John's tomb and verses lamenting his untimely death — wrote "the Dying Negro" which was the story in verse of another black man, trapped in a situation similar to that of James Somersett. If one adds to this the fact that Denmark Vesey plied the Bermuda triangle for many years with his master Captain Vesey — we begin to probe another side of the commercial life of Charleston.

I have been warned that I should not bore you with my enthusiasms. Therefore let me conclude by stating my faith in the value of historical editing as a way to become immersed in the study of history and as a key for unlocking historical doors — hidden or long-forgotten.

The National Historical Publications and Records Commission has been holding for a number of years an editing Institute every June — for four years at the University of Virginia, for the past year and this coming June at the University of South Carolina, and in the future in some other part of the country. It is a permanent part of the Commission's program. Eighteen interns are selected each year for an intensive two-week course which introduces the students to the problems involved in searching, transcribing, management of records, annotating, proof-reading, indexing, etc. Speakers are brought in from the various projects sponsored by the Commission. I recall from last June the talk of Ted Carter who introduced us to the mysteries of the microfiche publication planned and completed by the staff of the Latrobe papers. Andrew Oliver, who has published books on the portraits of John and Abigail Adams and of John Marshall, taught us how to illustrate an editing project. David Chesnutt is the one who handles all the details and provides for the smooth running of the Institute. Among those who have attended as interns are individuals who now hold such positions as archivist of the state of New York, director of the Clements Library at Ann Arbor, assistant editor on the papers of Charles Willson Peale, and editor of the papers of the Supreme Court during the first decade of the nation. One young man is now assistant to the Director at the Commission headquarters in Washington. A young lady after attending succeeded in having her project sponsored by the NHPRC — a project to edit the papers of Lydia Maria Child, the New England abolitionist.

In our own department we now have a program in Applied History which has been built up by Walter Edgar. Both David Chesnutt and Walter Edgar held Fellowships in Historical Editing awarded by the Commission and thus had their introduction to historical editing. Among the courses offered in our Applied History program is a course in Historical Editing which I taught for the first time last fall. There were sixteen students who selected a variety of documents to edit. Was it a success? I have some mixed feelings. Eleven have now completed their work; five papers are still outstanding. Two persons worked on the papers of the Hammond family — one with reference to letters written from Redcliffe and the other with reference to letters from Johns Hopkins. In this way they assisted Dr. Carol Bleser who is contemplating a work on Southern women in the post-Civil War period.

Editing projects such as those we have considered take time and money. There is now growing pressure upon us to complete our tasks quickly. Thanks to Aaron Burr, the Hamilton Papers are coming to a conclusion. David and I are optimistic enough to think that we now see the end of the road for our own endeavors. We had always intended to change to a selective rather than complete edition of the papers of Henry Laurens when we arrived at that point in Laurens' career when he assumed public roles. As president of the Council of Safety and as president of the Continental Congress many items were generated which pertain more to the office than to the man. Thus we are now working on plans (at least I should say David is) for a microfiche supplement to the letterpress edition — so that those documents in the corpus of Laurens Papers, particularly those in the Council of Safety papers and the Continental Congress papers, which appear to be routine, etc., can be presented to scholars in a usable fashion and yet without extending the letterpress volumes unduly. We would like a design which would give access to the microfiche supplement through the letterpress edition. This means a theory of annotation which can lead quickly by cross references. The material presented in microfiche should be — as the first requirement — easy to read. Some documents therefore may be transcribed — that is the originals and the transcriptions may appear. Hopefully, what we do can become a model for others. By next September, the time of the next budget application, we shall have our design for the final five volumes and the microfiche supplement. In this way we can convince those who provide grants that we will in fact complete our tasks — and in a fashion highly acceptable to the profession.

I await the final day eagerly for it will mean that I can then turn to making use of the knowledge that I have gained while editing — most immediately to write a new biography of Henry Laurens, but perhaps even more importantly a history that will describe the full role that South Carolina played in the founding of the nation.

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[1] Information gleaned from a conversation with Andrew Oliver, June 1976.

[2] James Grant had been Colonel in command of the expedition against the Cherokees in 1761, in which expedition HL served as Lieutenant Colonel of the S. C. Provincial Regiment. In 1764 Grant was selected to be the first governor of East Florida and while he served in that province (until May of 1771) he often called upon HL for advice and assistance.

[3] Review of **The Papers of Henry Laurens,** Volume Five (1765-1768) printed in **South Carolina Historical Magazine,** LXXVIII (1977), 74-75.

[4] **South Carolina Gazette,** June 7, 1770.

[5] Henry Laurens to William Carter, Dec. 28, 1770. To be published in Volume Seven of **The Papers of Henry Laurens.**

[6] **South Carolina Gazette,** April 6, 1769.

[7] **The Papers of Henry Laurens,** V (1765-1768), 52n.

[8] Richard Waterhouse, "South Carolina's Colonial Elite: A Study in the Social Structure and Political Culture of a Southern Colony, 1670-1760" (PhD. diss., The Johns Hopkins Univ., 1973).

[9] "Diary of William Dillwyn During a Visit to Charles Town in 1772-1773," edited by A. S. Salley, SCHM, XXXVI (1935), 108.

[10] **South Carolina and American General Gazette,** March 12, 1771.

[11] **South Carolina and American General Gazette,** March 26, 1771.

[12] **South Carolina and American General Gazette,** April 24, 1771.

[13] **South Carolina and American General Gazette,** Dec. 5, 1770.

[14] George C. Rogers, Jr., **Evolution of a Federalist, William Loughton Smith of Charleston (1758-1812)** (Columbia, S. C., 1962), p. 23.

[15] "Diary of William Dillwyn During a Visit to Charles Town in 1772-1773," edited by A. S. Salley, SCHM, XXXVI (1935), 108-109.

[16] Rogers, **op. cit.,** p. 57.

[17] **South Carolina Gazette,** May 10, 17, 1770.

[18] E. Milby Burton, **South Carolina Silversmiths, 1690-1860** (Charleston, S. C., 1942); E. Milby Burton, **Charleston Furniture, 1700-1825** (Columbia, S. C., 1970).

[19] **South Carolina and American General Gazette,** Nov. 27, 1770.

[20] Equiano, **The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African (London, 1789),** pp. 23, 115, 168, 176, 193.

"FATEFUL LEGACY: WHITE SOUTHERNERS AND THE DILEMMA OF EMANCIPATION"

By Dan T. Carter

When the Civil War ended in April of 1865, the victorious North was deeply divided over two crucial questions: what was to become of the white South, and what was to be done with the two and a half million freed slaves? White Southerners had plunged a peaceful nation into a nightmare of bloodshed and destruction. In the minds of most Northerners, secession appropriately symbolized the final act of Southern estrangement. It was not simply that the region adhered to archaic political ideas and an immoral and outmoded system of human labor, the South was antagonistic in every respect to the spirit of modernism. It was agrarian in an age which increasingly emphasized industrialism and it was generally conservative and antagonistic to new ideas in a young nation which encouraged liberal social and intellectual experimentation.

Were these wicked, sinful and backward people therefore to be welcomed back as erring brothers? Or were they to be held at arms length until they exhibited a properly penitential spirit; until they were "Reconstructed" in a form more suitable for membership in the nation they had spurned in 1861? To put the matter bluntly: just how worthy of citizenship were these proud Southerners?

The second question was inextricably interwoven with the first. The emancipation proclamation, and later the thirteenth amendment, outlawed slavery but it did little to define the future status of the freedmen of the South. Were they to be given the full rights and privileges of citizenship? Or were they to be granted some status half-way between chattel slavery and complete political equality?

In the best of times, these would have been difficult problems, but these were not the best of times. A legacy of ante-bellum and war-time hatreds clouded the issues and solutions were all too often shaped by grasping attempts to cultivate political and economic power, as Republicans sought to protect their narrow majority and Northern Democrats attempted to regain the political support of their Democratic brothers in the South. Above all else the nation faced this crisis without the healing leadership of Abraham Lincoln.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the triumphant North was like a noisome Tower of Babel in the spring of 1865. In dealing with the white South, some conservatively counselled compassion and immediate political reconciliation. Others insisted that such talk was folly.

The South had spurned the union; it should be readmitted only after it had proved its loyalty and reliability. In many respects, the new President Andrew Johnson seemed to mirror this schizophrenic attitude with his harsh promise that "traitors would be punished" and his remarkably lenient policy toward the defeated South.

As far as the freedmen were concerned the political landscape seemed only slightly less chaotic. Most Northerners were willing, indeed insistent, upon granting the civil rights to the freedmen of the South. Blacks should be allowed to hold property, to sue and be sued, to testify in court, to be secure in their persons and property: in short to be treated as equals before the law. But there was little substantial support for full political rights for Southern blacks. In the past decade, more than a dozen American historians have analyzed and described Northern racial attitudes in the years before and during the civil war and their conclusions are depressingly similar. The majority of Northern whites feared and despised blacks as well as the institution of slavery and their opposition to Southern expansionism in the 1850's more often than not reflected white racism rather than a genuine concern for the plight of the ante-bellum slave.

Nevertheless, within less than three years after the war had ended, the Congress of the United States had adopted the most far-reaching civil rights legislation in our history. The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments had been launched on the road to ratification and the era of "Radical" Reconstruction had begun.

In seeking to unravel this mystery of causation, historians have approached the question from a number of perspectives. In an earlier era, Reconstruction was attributed to an atmosphere of national hatred and revenge carefully choreographed by such Republican Radicals as Thaddeus Stephens, Charles Sumner and Beast Ben Butler.

More recently there has been a tendency to de-emphasize the role of the radical Republicans. What seems clear from the evidence is the basic conservatism of most Republicans and their genuine reluctance to adopt coercive measures against the South. Eric McKitrick probably captured this new direction best in his 1960 biography of Andrew Johnson when he argued that it was the violent resistance of the white South to any change tha led to the adoption of radical Reconstruction. White Southerners made a number of fatal blunders in the immediate post-war period, says McKitrick. They ignored Johnson's modest Reconstruction requirements and instead adopted black codes which severely restricted the civil and economic rights of the freedmen. They elected to local and state office the very secessionists who had precipitated the war and plunged the South into racial turmoil by using violence, murder and even assassination to strike down any proponents of political rights for blacks. In short, the recalcitrance of the white South in 1865, coupled with Johnson's personal inflexibility and political ineptitude, forced a reluctant Republican congress to adopt the very Reconstruction measures white Southerners had feared and opposed.[1]

But why did Southerners make such a horrendous miscalculation for the second time in five years? What drove them toward their own political self-destruction? These are questions which have been answered less satisfactorily.

The problem is more perplexing to me, because of the intellectual changes in Southern society in the immediate post-war period. The peculiar defensiveness of the region before 1860 had always exaggerated the appearance of unity within the region. As W. T. Couch observed in 1933, the life of the South had always been characterized by class divisions and "wide differences in political, economic, racial, educational and religious faiths." Defeat shattered the facade of unanimity among white Southerners which had triumphed in the ante-bellum period. For one brief almost euphoric period, white Southerners seemed to speak their minds bluntly and without the restraints which had characterized Southern debate since the days of Jefferson and Madison. In a July 4, 1865 speech, Georgia's Provincial Governor declared of the old South, "We abused mankind when they differed with us." Southerners had carried their opposition to men's thinking "to such an extreme, that men among us who dared to differ . . . were arraigned, not by law or before a legal tribunal, but before vigilantee (sic) societies and personally abused." Civilization was driven from the land, charged the provincial governor of Georgia, and "law and order was suppressed by lawless men." Under the title "Things Passing Away," the Raleigh, North Carolina **Standard** compiled a staggering indictment against the "bigotry, terrorism and repression" of the pre-war South and urged Southerners to turn these practices forever aside. And the **Standard** called for complete, free and open debate on all issues. The time for a "false unity" had passed.[2]

With the political and intellectual unity of the ante-bellum period fractured, Southerners were often free to voice their self-doubts and questions concerning Southern society. For those who had secretly favored change in Southern society, but who had muted their calls for reform because of the necessity of unity and cohesion, the shambles of the old society seemed to suggest that a new day was dawning; the defeat of 1865 would be a beginning rather than an end. "I am very frank to say that I do zealously favor reconstruction," wrote the President of North Carolina's Trinity College in July of 1865. And his cheerful acceptance of change echoed across the South. "We should forget the past," an enthusiastic

Mississippi lawyer wrote his wife six months after the war was over. "We must create language, literature and art; we must develop science." The South's ante-bellum life of ease and prosperity built upon slavery had been a curse which had dulled the sensibilities of the region. The abridgement of this false prosperity "will be the dawn of a New Era."[3]

Such summonses to a New South were not always couched in such vague generalities. In particular, one is struck by manifestations of what Paul Gaston would later call the "New South Creed." In every town, every hamlet of the South, Southerners of various political persuasions strained to understand the implications of the war. And the most compelling lesson that seemed to emerge was the failure of ante-bellum institutions and ideas.

All during the 1840's and 1850's, J. D. B. DeBow's **Review** had been the forum for those Southerners who supported manufacturing interests. William Gregg, James Taylor, Joseph Henry Lumpkin, Richard F. Reynolds, A. H. Brisbane, Daniel Pratt: such men had zealously supported economic diversification and industrialization as essential for the future of the South. As the war approached however, their arguments had been increasingly muted by Southerners' suspicion that industrialism was incompatable with the South's institutions — particularly slavery. Now that slavery was gone and the vaunted King Cotton strategy had been exposed as a hollow mockery, the proponents of industrialization stood vindicated.

Such ideas were not completely new, but there were some striking differences between the ante-bellum and post-war advocates of modernization. Post-war reformers not only supported industrialization, they were much more likely to bluntly attack the plantation system. The radical reformation in the labor system wrought by the abolition of slavery challenged the keystone of Southern society, plantation agriculture. Some reformers welcomed this change; others accepted it reluctantly, but beginning with this common ground they proposed more substantial alterations in Southern agriculture, alterations which would result in the breakup of landholding patterns, the abandonment of staplecrop production and the creation of a white yeoman farming class.

"Now that slavery no longer exists, it has become a social necessity to break up and abandon the plantation system," argued the Augusta **Chronicle and Sentinel** in June of 1865, and such heresy soon echoed through every major rural magazine published in the post-war period. **The Field and Fireside**, a North Carolina magazine devoted to the elevation of agriculture and the promotion of "Pure and Dignified Literature" called upon Southern landowners to "divide and sub-divide" their immense plantations.[4]

Writers, particularly in the Southeast, seem to have accepted the notion that staple crop production was strictly a thing of the past. "The knell of African slavery in the South, in our judgment doomed cotton as king," declared the Raleigh **Sentinel.** And, while the plant would continue to be produced throughout the South, cotton — as well as rice, sugar and tobacco — would inevitably go into a decline in the South. As a committee of the South Carolina legislature concluded, the prevailing argument that the staple crop product of "plantation system is best adapted to the South" was a casualty of the war. There was still a place in the Southern scheme of things, "but there is now an even greater place for the small farm."[5]

In the wake of defeat, therefore, Jefferson's vision of a region of small yeoman farms was reborn, not simply as a complement to the great landed estates, but a replacement. To Southerners who were well aware of the differences between the shabby, run-down and dilapidated nature of most Southern agriculture and the well kept fields of Northern farms, it was a beguiling prospect. Within ten years, said one North Carolina newspaper, plantations with their centralized labor system would be replaced by "small, neat flourishings and improved farms. . . ."[6]

In some respects, of course, this tale of self-reconstruction was little more than an updating of the old ante-bellum Whig program: internal improvements, the development of complementary manufacturing interests, the diversification and modernization of American agriculture. For some Southerners, however, reconstruction was more than this. In practical terms they were much more likely to welcome industrialization per se as an end within itself; they were much more likely to express open criticism of the plantation system and the large landholding system per se. But the essential difference was of a cast of mind, an outlook which was subtly different. What was needed, declared Thomas Settle of North Carolina, was not simply "railroads, canals, steamboats, factories, workshops, cities, towns, beautiful villages and neat farm houses;" what was needed was to "bury a thousand fathoms deep" the ideas and feelings of the past and to recast the spirit of the South in a mode of "universal progress."[7]

Georgia Judge O. A. Lochrane argued in the summer of 1865 that the great war was a chasm which separated the old South from the new. It was difficult for men to "shake down their convictions like apples from a tree," he admitted. "But the lessons of the past years are unmistakeable." Unless an "improved and enlightened civilization" emerged from the ashes of the South, unless the backward customs and attitudes of the region could be swept away, the South would blindly relive the mistakes of the past. "We must be men, not monuments . . . . Let not pride, prejudice, and folly blind us and lead us stumbling backward over a wilderness of graves . . . ." The South, he concluded, had to be "reconstructed" in a mold more in keeping with the "enlightened spirit of the age."[8]

Given this remarkable burst of political candor and openness, given this near surrender to the very social and economic forces that had stood against the South, it is obvious that the essential problem was the future of the emancipated slave. What was to become of the freedmen? This was not a question of the racist South versus the idealistic North. Racism permeated the North as well as the South. But there were unmisakeable differences between the two regions. Northerners watched the results of emancipation with mild concern, and a kind of quizzical curiosity as an experiment to be followed with interest and even some limited commitment. To white Southerners, however, it was the crucial question of their generation and they watched this massive experiment in freedom not with idle curiosity, but with passionate, involved commitment. On the outcome of this "experiment" rested the future of the South.

Thus no question so preoccupied Southerners after the war as that of the future of the freedman and his role in Southern society. The "negro question" was on everyone's lips in the weeks after the end of the war, reported a Mississippi parson in the spring of 1865.[9] Six months later, Northern travelers to the South still found it the main topic of conversation with the Southerners they met. "Everybody talks about the negro, at all hours of the day, and under all circumstances," reported the Boston journalist Sidney Andrews in his post-war travels. "Let conversation begin where it will, it ends with Sambo."[10] While concerns covered every phase of the future of black-white relations, the central preoccupation (at least initially) was over the degree to which the freedmen would continue to furnish the labor supply of the region.

The public pronouncements of white Southerners were usually sober calls for a measured attempt to work with free labor, coupled with warnings that the future of such experiments was entirely dependent upon the leeway given to the South in working through this difficult period of readjustment. Privately, the observations of most Southerners were a melange of fear, uncertainty, and deep pessimism, leavened only occasionally by a grudging and guarded optimism.

Their misgivings stemmed from their own pro-slavery pronouncements, the historical experiences of emancipation in other societies and the war-time experiments of a few ex-slaveowners with free black labor.

It was an article of faith, so commonly held it was seldom necessary to explicitly state it, that the freedman was inherently indolent and opposed to physical exertion. It was the carefully controlled use of force by the slaveowner which (for his own good) kept the slave at work, maintained the economic viability of Southern agriculture, and incidentally, returned a profit as well. Nor were such misgivings based upon idle speculation. Free Black labor had been tried on a massive scale in the islands of the Caribbean; first in French Haiti and later in the British possessions. In his ante-bellum paean to the slave society, William Grayson summed up white Southerners' perceptions of the results of this bleak experiment in freedom:

> The Bright Antilles, with each closing year,
> See harvests fail, and fortunes disappear;
> The cane no more its golden treasure yields;
> Unsightly weeds deform the fertile fields;
> The negro freeman, thrifty while a slave,
> Loosed from restraint, becomes a drone or knave;
> Each effort to improve his nature foils,
> Begs, steals, or sleeps and starves, but never toils;
> For savage sloth mistakes the freedom won,
> And ends the mere barbarian he begun.[11]

Such descriptions of the lapse into indolence and the resulting decline in the economies of the Caribbean islands, were standard fare in the ante-bellum period, and they struck home with particular force as Southerners faced a similar situation. In the first issue published after emancipation, the Georgia magazine, **Southern Cultivator,** morosely described the depressing statistics of economic disintegration in the wake of the emancipation of Caribbean blacks, while the economic "expert" of the South, J. D. B. DeBow, recited equally gloomy statistics. Under slavery, the islands of the Caribbean had been a "fairy land of perpetual beauty," "astonishing fertility" and "enormous riches." Since the slaves were freed, however, land values had declined eighty per cent, the currency had become worthless, plantations were abandoned and, in Jamaica alone, exports had declined three hundred per cent from 1809 to 1854.[12]

Such a litany of foreboding recurred again and again in the post-war press of the South. Blacks, freed from the imperatives of work "gradually retired from labor"; content to work just enough to get by, went the refrain, they thus became marginal subsistence farmers at best and destroyed the agricultural productivity of the region. It was scarcely necessary to reiterate the facts of such depressing events, noted South Carolina's W. W. Boyce. "The Black race is proverbially indolent and improvident, and we cannot shut our eyes to the facts of history. All readers are familiar with the experiment of emancipation in Jamaica."[13]

Even more conclusive was the experience of white Southerners during the war in their attempts to work with free labor. As soon as the Union soldiers had entered Southern soil, the institution of slavery began to crumble. Experiments with free labor were made in a number of locations — notably the famous Port Royal District of Coastal Carolina. But there were also a good number of plantations worked by free labor in the Delta region after federal troops moved South from Vicksburg. In some instances, plantations were leased to Northern investors, while the Federal government occasionally assumed direct responsibility. In others, "loyal" Southerners were allowed to retain their plantation and it was these latter experiments that were most discouraging.[14]

From Terrebone Parish in Louisiana a sugar plantation owner recounted in June of 1865 the effects of "free labor" upon agricultural production in that area. In 1861 he had produced 600 hogsheads of sugar on his plantation. In 1863, the first year of his experiment with free labor, production declined to 260 hogsheads. When he tried to reassert "discipline," the freedmen rebelled and he produced less than 90 hogsheads in 1864.[15] It was hardly a description to arouse hope and enthusiasm among Southern planters. Such discouraging accounts of the effects of emancipation were reprinted in Southern newspapers and common knowledge by the spring of 1865.

In part, the bleak assessment was colored by the bitterness which Southerners expressed when they discovered that their faithful slaves were neither slaves nor faithful once they had the opportunity. Dr. Elias Henry Deas, a rice planter on the Cooper River near Charleston and a prominent South Carolina physician had confidently predicted during the war that — regardless of the outcome — his faithful slaves would remain by his side. Instead, as soon as the Federals arrived, they scattered in every direction. Hurt and bewildered initially, his surprise turned to rage as he bitterly told his daughter of their perfidy. The younger ones he could accept, he said, "but the old ones in a great many instances are no better than the young." All his life, said Augustin Taveau of Charleston, he had unquestionably believed that the South's slaves were "content, happy and attached to their masters." The events of the spring of 1865 shattered this comforting illusion. "Good master and bad master, all alike shared the same fate . . . ." The freedmen reacted with duplicity and treachery. "We have all been labouring under a delusion."[16]

The misgivings over the suitability of freedmen as laborers seemed amply borne out by events during the late spring and summer of 1865. At times, the private correspondence and personal diaries of Southern landowners seemed little more than a litany of complaints over the disastrous qualities of the freedman as laborer. "The negroes you hire work about one half their time and are idle the balance," recorded David Schenck in his diary in June of 1865. As a class they were "idle, improvident and roguish." "Our negroes" did as they pleased. complained Samuel Agnew of Tipton County, Mississippi, going off in the wagon daily "and not giving their master's concerns any attention." Complaints of indolence and laziness had been standard fare throughout the ante-bellum period and rare indeed was the slaveowner who boasted of the work habits of his property. Deprived of ultimate authority, however, and facing economic deprivation and bankruptcy in many instances, the white Southerner's concern over the alleged shiftlessness of his charges became a raging anger.[17]

Complaints of thievery by the freedmen vied with those of laziness in the months after the end of the war. "You can not yet fully conceive the annoyance we have from the miserable conduct of the negroes," complained a Sidney, Alabama planter. "They steal everything that they can secrete." Whenever an implement, tool or livestock vanished, said Josi Borden, he was quick to question his hands, but he raged **"nobody ever knows anything about it."** "There is so much stealing going on down here you never saw the equal to it," a South Carolina girl wrote her cousin. "You cannot have a hog or cow unless you keep it in your yard." To leave an article of clothing outside to dry was to make a certain involuntary donation to charity. In contrast, Mrs. Anna R. Salley, the wife of an Orangeburg, South Carolina farmer, denied to an Aunt that the freedmen were responsible for all the theft that existed in the months after the war. "The whites are as much to be dreaded now as the blacks." But it was far too easy to simply blame the freedmen for any unexplained disappearance of property.[18]

Equally disconcerting to Southerners was the movement of blacks away from the labor-starved plantations to the villages, towns and cities of the South. In the contemporary literature, in the writings of later historians and even in the works of novelist, the theme of the exodus became a powerful element of the drama of emancipation. The city of Richmond was a sea of "negro and Yankee, Yankee and negro, ad nauseum," wrote Lucy Walton in her diary. "I am frequently stopped by piles of negro goods and chatter issuing from the gates of their old homes . . . . as they start off to some fancied Elysian fields of Freedom . . . . The streets are thronged with Negroes of all shades . . . ." In Charleston, an elderly planter described with shocked amazement the "swarms of negroes" as they wandered up and down the streets, engaging in raucous behavior, petty thievery and nightly fighting. In the year after emancipation, a Charleston grand jury complained that mobs of blacks roamed the cities "attacking innocent citizens at will" and jeapordizing the persons and property of law-abiding citizens.[19]

What seems apparent is that the myth of the urban exodus serves to illustrate the renewed visibility of blacks rather than their acual massive influx into towns and cities. Before 1865, freedmen had been in a relatively small minority; slaves had gone into town only on errands and specific assignments. As a result, blacks were — if not a rare sight — at least a small minority. After emancipation, however, the trip to town became one of the most visible symbols of freedom. The freedom to move about freely was a cherished one, particularly on the weekends. On the other hand, it was such a striking departure that whites were likely to view it as revolutionary and to resist such a change at every point. As a result, the question of "trips to town" became a prime source of conflict, particularly at contract time when whites tried to write into their contract arrangements provisions against leaving the plantation without permission. The laborer "must be confined to the plantation for a series of years . . .," concluded a Louisiana sugar planter. If blacks were allowed to move at will from plantation to plantation and to vanish into nearby towns and villages whenever the whim attracted them, "it would be far better (and) . . . . cheaper to abandon these lands, however productive in former times . . . ." The freedmen, on the other hand, steadfastly resisted such prohibitions against their freedom of movement.[20]

Nor was it simply a matter of reasserting labor stability. The prospect of "barbarism" and "savagery" was suggested again and again by Southerners gloomily viewing the post-war era. As the Atlanta **Daily Intelligencer** observed in the first weeks after Appomattox, the "Cyclopedia of Commerce" confirmed what was common knowledge; in every society where black slaves had been emancipated, the result was that the freedmen receded quickly into a "savage state." This, said the **Intelligencer** was an "indication of what we are to expect from a similar policy. Already there were signs of the "shockingly degraded condition of the Negro."[21]

The sharp dichotomy between Northern and Southern whites' conceptions of the nature of society (and the character of the Negro) can nowhere be seen better than the Insurrection hysteria which swept through the South in the summer and fall of 1865, culminating in the widespread belief that the freedmen would "rise" on Christmas Day of their first year of freedom and plunge the South into a bloody holocaust. There is not the time here to review the full circumstances of this bizarre episode in Southern history, but the events are plain enough. Between August and December of 1865, huge sections of the Southeast and Southwest — primarily in the black belt region — became convinced that blacks were going to rise, slaughter the whites and seize the land for themselves. The Insurrection Panic of 1865 was extraordinary proof of the way in which white Southerners had become prisoners of their own fears and illusions. There is not one iota of evidence to support this panic: and yet thousands of white Southerners were convinced they were on the verge of a racial Armageddon.[22]

The fear of a black uprising was only one facet of the gloomy outlook of white Southerners. Even if the region should be spared a war of the races, its economy ultimately would be crippled by the gradual extinction of the region's black work force. "The negro race will now run out," a former governor of South Carolina glumly predicted in 1865. With the "strong arm of the white man" withdrawn, they will pass from the North American continent in three generations.

A Georgia bishop sadly agreed. He insisted that he had the "highest interests" of the former slaves at heart, but no amount of instructing or teaching could forestall the inevitable. "Avarice and cupidity and ignorance will do for their extinction what they have always done for any unprotected inferior race. Poverty, disease, intemperance will follow in their train and do the rest." There was a sonorous ring of certainty to all these easy and glib predictions. Ethnography, history, and plain common sense, were all summoned to document the obvious. The "mulattoes" as an inferior "hybrid" race would be the first to go, observed the New York **World**.[23] Very shortly, however, the blacks would sink into their natural state of barbarism and savagery.

A considerable number of white Southerners saw evidence of their pessimism confirmed in the conditions of blacks during the post-war period. A committee of Calhoun County, S. C. citizens insisted that, already the blacks were "diminishing at a fearful rate. The common estimate of their loss since 1860 is 1,000,000 of lives, or one quarter of their whole number."[24] Other observers recounted tales of huddled blacks pulled together in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, "dying of disease and want . . . ." Such a process was accellerated by the refusal of the blacks to attend to each other. "They will often see a fellow-laborer, and even a near relative, die for want of a cup of gruel, or of water, rather than lose a few hours' sleep in watching," declared a Mobile doctor. While a correspondent of the **Georgia Enquirer** concluded his observation of the condition of blacks' health with the sarcastic observation that the "day will come when a Yankee will exhibit among the 'Cowikees' a bush negro as a curiosity, charging 25 cents admission fee."[25]

Such pronouncements occasionally sprang from something approaching an exercise in wish fullfillment. Nevertheless, this belief in black extinction was more than a prefabrication. And this may be seen in one of the most bizarre adventures of the post-war South: the immigration craze of 1865. The grandiose schemes to bring European whites into the South were compounded of fantasy, fear, hope and ignorance and it illustrated the complex emotional and intellectual currents of the post-war South.

With the days of the freedmen numbered, "population like capital will seek its equilibrium," said the **Southern Cultivator.** "The vast wave of (European) immigration . . . (to the North) will not now stop there." Attracted by the South's mild climate, rich farmland and mineral wealth it would "flow over and fertilize the whole South with the moveable wealth this population will bring . . . ."[26] Joseph Cannon and William Holden of the North Carolina **Daily Standard** also suggested the inevitability of European immigration now that the most productive lands of the region were available at such low prices and the Negro was no longer a completing factor.[27]

For the proponents of Southern modernization, such a development was long overdue. It meshed perfectly with their dream of reshaping Southern society. The European immigrant would become the sturdy yeoman of the Jeffersonian dream. If all the large Southern plantations and farms were divided into smaller family size farms to be cultivated by "responsible" European immigrants and Northern white labor, "instead of the large worn-out, unproductive fields so much the rule in former days, they would soon be substituted by small, neat, flourishing and improved farms." The post-war editor of the Augusta **Chronicle** and **Sentinel,** poured scathing ridicule on the "obsession" of the ante-bellum Southerners to own land — regardless of its productivity. The results of such a policy had been disastrous he told his readers in the summer of 1865. White Southerners had become enmeshed in the single crop cycle and the plantation system had left the region progressively poorer except in a few extremely rich areas of the delta. But slavery at least had been a compelling factor in this system. With the institution gone, the time was ripe to strike for an independent white yeomanry composed of Northern and European immigrants.[28]

The quest of Southerners for European and Northern immigrants was a fool's errand as many perceptive Southerners soon came to realize. As **The Farmer** concluded glumly in 1867, the emigration from Europe would "never flow into the South as it does to the North West. We have not the inducements that are held out by the new states." Few emigrants were willing to work for wages on the washed out lands of the Southeast or the malerial swamps of the delta when they could homestead great sections of fertile land in the west.[29] The direction of post-war immigration confirmed such pessimism. During the first year after the war, 250,000 immigrants came to the United States. About 100,000 settled in New York. Illinois received 22,000 immigrants; Wisconsin 9,000; Pennsylvania 25,000 and Ohio 13,000. In contrast, the entire South received less than 3,000 immigrants with the great majority settling in Virginia and Tennessee. It was hardly the stuff of which giant movements were made.[30]

Even when Southerners succeeded in bringing groups of immigrants to settle in the South, their experiments were almost uniformly disastrous. J. Floyd King, the son of a wealthy Georgia planter (Thomas Butler King) came out of the war with little more than his good name and a record of service in the Confederacy. He had gone North in the summer of 1865 with grandiose plans to start a saw mill on his old family plantation, but he found few backers. Instead, he soon became an enthusiastic agent of the American Emigrant Company. With his background in planting and his distinguished Southern connections, the AEC selected him for a major experiment in emigrant labor. In the fall of 1865 he sailed from New York with a cargo of 213 Dutch, Danish and German immigrants and a committment to lease a 22,000 acre Louisiana Delta Plantation.[31]

While King started with high hopes he quickly inherited a nightmare. Shortly after he landed in New Orleans, he almost lost his entire contingent when a local planter offered them jobs at more than the AEC had promised. With a little help from local parish officials he managed to get them up river to the plantation near Natchez, Mississippi where they had been promised there was comfortable housing and ample food. When they saw the dilapidated slave shacks and tasted their first meal of mouldy fatback and stale cornbread they sat down and refused to work. Even when King frantically began repairing the cabins and promised fresh beef and bacon each day, he had little success. By the end of January he had lost half his labor force and each roll call revealed a diminished number of laborers. The "experiment," he frankly conceded, was a failure.

> So far in this experiment I am satisfied that **where the negro will work,** he is the most profitable laborer, so much thro his education in cotton culture as anything else; the Emigrant is much the more expensive to feed and keep, and at present he is ignorant of the manner in which the plant is made to grow and to produce to the best advantage.[32]

That was the crucial phrase: **"where the negro will work."** Historians have understandably focused upon the actions of Southern whites which seemed to have had the greatest effect on national policy; the adoption of the black codes and the election of ante-bellum secessionists for example. It is equally important, however, to examine the state of mind of white Southerners as they approached the post-war era. As a group, they were convinced that economic recovery was tied to a restoration of dependable black labor. They were equally convinced that blacks would not work without legal and physical coercion. Above all, they were fearful that the freedmen and women were teetering on the verge of "barbarism" and mass violence.

Under these circumstances, it is no justification for the violent abuses of post-war white Southerners to say that they were swept along by fears and illusions which severely constrained their intellectual freedom of action. Some would make a modest break with the past. For most the emotional habits were too deeply embedded. Even when the worst apprehensions had been dispelled, the deep scars of slavery would remain. In the tortured mental and emotional landscape of the post-war South, reality had blended with illusion; in a world turned upside down white Southerners had lost their bearings. In that respect, the events of the post-war period in Southern society became something like a Greek tragedy. The flaw was a racial perspective tragically distorted by 200 years of slavery. Both slave and master had become victims of the peculiar institution.

Given the bleak range of alternatives for the post-war period, it is no wonder that younger — and sometimes more radical historians — have longed for an "iron fist" which would have forced the white South to yield to change regardless of these racial blinders. Given the nature of Northern racism and the general national reluctance to expand the power of the federal government, I find this a rather dubious form of historical Monday-morning quarterbacking. As Judge Lochrane so accurately put it, it was indeed difficult for men to shake down their convictions like apples from a tree.

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[1] McKitrick's general conclusion has been sustained by a number of later studies, notably Michael Les Benedict's **A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863-1869** (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1974).

[2] W. T. Couch, **Culture in the South** (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934), vii-viii; **Macon Daily Telegraph,** July 5, 1865; **Raleigh Daily Standard,** August 8, 1865.

[3] Braxton Craven to Bishop Edward Ames, July 24, 1865, Braxton Craven Papers, Duke University Library; Charles Wallace to Wife, October 1, 1865, John Clopton Collection, Duke University Library.

[4] **Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel,** June 28, 1865; **Field and Fireside,** quoted in **The Farmer,** I (August, 1866), 322-23.

[5] **Raleigh Sentinel,** January 24, 1866; **Report of the South Carolina Committee on Immigration, 1866,** p. 14.

[6] **Raleigh Sentinel,** October 27, 1866.

[7] Notes of Thomas Settle Speech, March, 1867, in Settle Papers, Southern Historical Collection.

[8] **Macon Daily Telegraph,** August 3, 1865.

[9] Samuel Agnew Diary, May 29, 1865, Southern Historical Collection.

[10] Sidney Andrews, **The South Since the War** (Boston: Tichnor and Fields, 1866), p. 22.

[11] William J. Grayson, **The Hireling and the Slave, Chicora and Other Poems** (Charleston: McCord & Co., 1856), p. 34.

[12] DeBow, "The State of the Country," **DeBow's Review**, I (n.s.) February, 1866, 141 ff.

[13] W. W. Boyce, "President Johnson's Plan of Reconstruction, **DeBow's Review**, I (n.s.) (January, 1866), 74.

[14] For a brief description of these war-time experiments with free labor, see Bell I. Wiley, **Southern Negroes, 1861-1865** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 230-59.

[15] See letter to the editor in the New Orleans **Times**, reprinted in Houston **Tri-Weekly Telegraph**, June 7, 1865.

[16] Elias Horry Deas to Daughter, May 5, July 15, August 15, 1865, Deas Papers, South Caroliniana Library; Augustin L. Taveau to William Aiken, April 24, 1865, Taveau Papers, Duke University Library.

[17] David Schenck Diary, June 14, 1865, Southern Historical Collection; Samuel Agnew Diary, July 24, 1865, Southern Historical Collection. Complaints of idleness among the freedmen were so common it would be impossible to list the citations from post-war planters' manuscript collection.

[18] Josi Borden to Doctor ? (illegible), October 2, 1865, in Reconstruction Miscellany, Folder Number 46, Emory University Special Collections; D. to Cousin, September 10, 1865, Hemphill Papers, Duke University Library; Anna Salley to Aunt, November 13, 1865, Bruce, Jones, Murchison Family Papers, South Caroliniana Library.

[19] Lucy Walton Diary, April 25, 1865, Duke University Library; Elias H. Deas to Daughter, May 5, 1865, South Caroliniana Library; Report of Charleston Coroner's Jury, July 5, 1866, in James L. Orr Papers, South Carolina State Archives.

[20] Letter in Houston **Tri-Weekly Telegraph**, June 7, 1865.

[21] Atlanta **Daily Intelligencer**, June 16, 1865.

[22] Dan T. Carter, "The Anatomy of Fear: The Christmas Day Insurrection Scare of 1865," **The Journal of Southern History, XLII** (August, 1976), 345-64.

[23] **DeBow's Review**, II (n.s.) (July, 1866), 313; New York **World**, quoted in the Atlanta **Daily Intelligencer**, July 15, 1865.

[24] Committee of Calhoun Citizens, "The Future of South Carolina," **DeBow's Review**, II (n.s.) (July, 1866), 441.

[25] Josiah Nott, "The Problem of the Black Races," **DeBow's Review**, I (n.s.) (March, 1866), 269, 281; Columbus **Georgia Enquirer**, September 29, 1865.

[26] **Southern Cultivator, XXIII** (August, 1865), 118.

[27] Raleigh **Daily Standard**, August 2, 1865.

[28] Raleigh **Sentinel**, October 27, 1865; Augusta **Chronicle and Sentinel**, June 28, 1865.

[29] **The Farmer**, II (February, 1867), 35-36.

[30] "Emigration at New York and the Emigration Board," **Merchant's Magazine**, LVII (September, 1867), 191.

[31] J. Floyd King to Anne Lin, December 24, 29, 1865, King Family Papers, Southern Historical Collection.

[32] J. Floyd King to John Mallery, January 18, 1866, King Family Papers, Southern Historical Collection.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA RANGERS
A Forgotten Loyalist Regiment

Robert D. Bass

(Editor's Note: This paper was presented at the Association's Luncheon Meeting at Furman University, April 3, 1976)

In 1778 the British High Command decided to Americanize the war in the provinces of North America. They used the same methods and achieved the same failure that the Americans did when they Vietnamized the recent war in Southeast Asia. They simply set Americans fighting other Americans. Their tactics in South Carolina succeeded in turning a revolution into a bloody civil war.

During the British stay in Philadelphia, Sir Henry Clinton began augmenting his forces by enlisting Americans on the provincial establishment, promising them the same pay, clothing, food, arms, and retirement as regulars from Britain. Lord Rawdon recruited a regiment from the Irishmen in the city and named it the Volunteers of Ireland. Sir Henry commissioned Rawdon the colonel and Welbore Ellis Doyle as the lieutenant colonel of these Loyalists. Lord Cathcart attempted to raise a regiment of Caledonian Volunteers, and when that failed Sir Henry turned the corps into the British Legion. He appointed Lord Cathcart the colonel and Major Banastre Tarleton the lieutenant colonel. Tarleton recruited four troops of light dragoons and three companies of infantry. He then molded the British Legion into the most powerful striking force in the British Army.

When Sir Henry started his southern campaign in 1780, he continued to augment his forces with provincial regiments. He assigned the command of the South Carolina Royalists to Colonel Alexander Innis, formerly secretary to Lord William Campbell, the last Royal Governor of South Carolina. He gave the American Volunteers to Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Ferguson and made him inspector of the Loyalist militia in South Carolina.

Sir Henry captured Charlestown on May 12, 1780, and then sent Lord Cornwallis and a powerful army to overrun the province. His Lordship reached Camden on June 1. He wanted some local provincial regiments to help win the populace. In an attempt to win the people of Ninety Six to the King's side Cornwallis offered Robert Cunningham a major's commission in the Provincial forces if he would recruit a regiment of 500 Loyalists. But Ninety Six District was too rebellious. Cunningham failed. Nevertheless he was later commissioned a brigadier general of Loyalist militia.

As soon as the arrival of Cornwallis at Camden became known, John Harrison, a planter who lived on Sparrow Swamp about three miles north of the present village of Lamar in Darlington County, rode over to Camden and told his Lordship that he could recruit a regiment of 500 men between Peedee and Santee. Hoping to keep a Loyalist force between Camden and Georgetown, Cornwallis gave a commission of major to Harrison on June 4 and supplied him with blank commissions for the proposed officers. In honor of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brown's Florida Rangers, they named the unborn regiment the South Carolina Rangers. Major John Harrison immediately rode back to Sparrow Swamp and on June 6 swore in his brothers Robert Harrison and Samuel Harrison as captains in the South Carolina Rangers. He also commissioned Samuel McConnell as lieutenant and two days later added Joel Hudson as lieutenant.

The Harrisons then chose the non-commissioned officers. They selected for sergeant: Joseph Payne, Jr., Joseph McKenney, John Eubanks and John Lewis; and for corporal: John Barr, Samuel Bennett and James McFrail.

His staff completed, Major Harrison began swearing in the privates and by nightfall on June 8 had enlisted fifty-eight. Their names, preserved on the muster rolls of the South Carolina Rangers in the Public Archives of Canada in Ottowa, are significant. Most of the surnames are English, thus revealing one of the sources of their loyalism. A few suggest the Scotch-Irish of Williamsburg and there is an occasional Huguenot. Several appear to have been brothers and one or two father and son. Many of their names are still found along Lynches River.

With his newly commissioned and non-commissioned officers and his fifty-eight recruits Major Harrison marched up to Camden and went into camp. But he continued recruiting and on June 12 five more joined the South Carolina Rangers.

The Whigs were watching the mustering of these Tories and by that date had so badly wounded Angus McFrail that he had been placed in the general hospital in Camden. Harrison retaliated by scourging the Presbyterian community around Salem, Black River. His Rangers killed several of the members, including elders of the church. Dr. Thomas Reese closed Salem Church, dismissed the students in his academy, and retired to Charlotte.

As Judge William Dobein James, who had been a student in the Salem Academy, wrote in his **A Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion**: "Among these one shall be mentioned, the Rev. Dr. Thomas Reese, of

Salem, on Black River. It was in his congregation that the murders perpetrated by Harrison and his followers first began, and three respectable men of his flock had already fallen victim to civil rage. Had he gone about to administer comfort out of his own family, it would have been termed sedition, and Dr. Reese would have made himself a voluntary martyr. He took the wiser course of retiring with his family before the storm . . ."

In his **Life**, Judge James gives us our best information about the Harrisons, but his hatred of them makes him a biased witness. He wrote of the South Carolina Rangers: "These were headed by the two Harrisons, one afterwards a colonel, the other a major in the British service; whom Tarlton calls men of fortune. They were in fact two of the greatest banditti that ever invested the country. Before the fall of Charleston they lived in a wretched log hut by the road, near McCallum's in which there was no bed covering but the skins of wild beasts."

While this civil war raged along Black and Lynches rivers, Harrison and his staff continued to recruit. On June 24 John Jenkins, deputy Muster Master for the Provincial forces came to the camp of the Rangers for a muster and inspection. He reported that there were in the South Carolina Rangers one major, two captains, two lieutenants, one ensign, four sergeants, three corporals, and eighty privates. Jenkins dated his report "near Camden," but the Rangers must have been somewhere near Radcliffe's Bridge some six or seven miles down Lynches from the present Bishopville.

The report of Muster Master Jenkins so pleased Lord Cornwallis that on June 30 he wrote Sir Henry Clinton: "I have agreed to a proposal made by Mr. Harrison, to to raise a provincial corps of five hundred men, with the rank of major, to be composed of the natives of the country between the Peedee and the Wateree, and in which it is extremely probable that he will succeed."

But there was a movement afoot on which Cornwallis did not count. Baron de Kalb with seven thousand troops was marching toward Camden. As he had passed through North Carolina, two ragged Continental officers named Francis Marion and Peter Horry joined his troops. When they were about twelve miles above Camden, General Horatio Gates detached the two Huguenots and sent them to supervise the militia in Williamsburg. On the next day Gates threw his arm against that of Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis and was decisively defeated. The British troops captured a thousand prisoners.

As Cornwallis wrote Sir Henry, he fought the battle of Camden only to save eight hundred British soldiers ill with fever. Afraid that the epidemic of malaria would spread to the prisoners, he began sending them to Charlestown in batches of one hundred and twenty-five.

Francis Marion with several companies of Williamsburg militia was on a boat burning foray up the Santee. On the night of August 24, the day that Muster Master Jenkins was paying his second visit to the South Carolina Rangers, Marion surprised the guards of the first batch of prisoners at the house of Colonel Thomas Sumter near Nelson's Ferry. He released the prisoners and fled toward Kingstree. Late on the afternoon of August 26 he crossed Lynches River at Witherspoon's Ferry and headed toward Port's Ferry on Peedee River.

The emergence of Francis Marion upon the Santee, from a firm base among the Whigs of Williamsburg, and with followers drawn from the country along Peedee River, stirred Lord Cornwallis to punitive steps. He ordered Major Wemyss to march his battalion of the 63rd Regiment from the High Hills of Santee to Kingstree. On August 28 he wrote: "I should advise your sweeping the country entirely from Kingstree Bridge to Peedee, and returning by the Cheraws."

Major Wemyss and his troops knew little of the topography of South Carolina, and so Cornwallis ordered Major Harrison and his Rangers to join Wemyss. They knew the roads, rivers, creeks, ferries, fords, and they were invaluable as guides, scouts and couriers. They also knew the other Loyalists and could lead the British to the homes of the Rebels.

Wemyss and Harrison marched into Williamsburg. At Kingstree they went on a rampage. Wemyss burned the Presbyterian Church at Indiantown, snorting "This is a sedition shop." He then led his troops to the home of Major John James. The major and son William Dobein were in Marion's camp in White Marsh, North Carolina. Hoping to lure Major James to try to rescue his family, Wemyss locked Mrs. James and her children in their home for two days. He then released them and burned the house before their eyes. William Dobein never forgave Wemyss and he carried an undying hatred of the Harrisons.

With Harrison's Rangers leading the way, Major Wemyss then burned a swath fifteen miles wide between Kingstree and Cheraw. In his report, dated September 20, Wemyss wrote: "I have done everything in my power to get at Mr. Marion" and then he summarized the situation in Williamsburg: every family involved, the women sullen, the men run off with Marion, and the slaves hiding out. Then in a postscript he added: "I forgot to tell your Lordship that I have burnt and laid waste about fifty houses and plantations."

On September 24 Lord Cornwallis marched the British Army into

Charlotte in what he expected would be the beginning of the subjugation of North Carolina. There he remained more than a month reorganizing the Loyalist militia and deploying the provincial regiments in strategic positions in South Carolina. He ordered Major Wemyss to move to Camden with the 63rd Regiment and to leave Harrison and his South Carolina Rangers posted at Cheraw. To reinforce Harrison's Rangers he sent Major Thomas Fraser with eighty mounted men of the South Carolina Royalist Regiment in the hope that "he will be able with the help of the Militia of the Lower Districts to secure the Country tolerably well."

In obedience to the order of Lord Cornwallis, Wemyss began preparing to return to Camden, and he decided to take the South Carolina Rangers back to their camping ground. On September 30 he wrote Cornwallis of his decision, excusing his "presuming in regard to Harrison's Corps to disobey your directions, being convinced that were they left here, that they would disperse in two or three days. They are if possible worse than militia, their sole desire being to plunder and steal, and when they have got as much as their horses will carry, to run home."

Back in their camp near Radcliffe's, the South Carolina Rangers found that Francis Marion had returned from White Marsh and on September 28 had destroyed the Loyalist militia of Colonel John Coming Ball at Black Mingo. He was campaigning freely between the Peedee and the Santee.

Colonel Balfour ordered Colonel Benjamin Tynes to muster the militia along Black River. Colonel Marion learned of the assembly at Tearcoat Swamp between Black and Pocotaligo rivers. He moved into Kingstree and spread a rumor that he was going up Lynches River to chastise Harrison and his Rangers. On the night of October 25, he fell upon the regiment of Tynes, sending them squandering so fast that eighty of them left their horses, saddles, and muskets. Judge James wrote: "His first intention was to chastise Harrison, on Lynches Creek, and he was moving up for that purpose." This is the only reference to the location of Harrison's camp.

The British next assigned Harrison and his South Carolina Rangers the duty of patroling the country between Santee and Peedee rivers and keeping a check over the guerrillas under Francis Marion. When Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton set out from Camden with his Green Horse on November 4, 1780, to drive Marion from the supply line along the Santee, he called in the South Carolina Rangers to serve as guides, couriers, and provisioners.

Harrison's Rangers were with Tarleton on the morning of November 8, 1780, when the Green Dragoon chased Francis Marion from Jack's Creek to Ox Swamp, in present Clarendon County, and cursed him for "a damned old Fox." They spread the story and helped to popularize the nickname Swamp Fox. The Rangers guided Tarleton and the dragoons of the British Legion for "26 miles through Swamps, Woods, and Fastnesses toward Black River without a halt," Tarleton reported to Lord Cornwallis. In his Campaign Report, dated at Singleton's Mills (Poinsett State Park), he devoted only one sentence to the Rangers: "A few prisoners were taken from the Swamps by Col. Harrison's Corps."

Upon his return from chasing the Swamp Fox, however, the Green Dragoon was lavish in his praise of the South Carolina Rangers. Lord Rawdon, who on November 13 had assumed command in Camden, reported to Lord Cornwallis: "I hear much of the prowess of Harrison's Rangers, upon the Expedition with Tarleton: a valiant friend of government is a Prodigy of which the World talks."

But in his secret cipher the young Irish Lord confirmed the opinion of James and Wemyss that the South Carolina Rangers were a banditti who lacked discipline: "They want to plunder and not do regular duty."

During their campaigning the South Carolina Rangers began suffering casualties. On October 14 Captain Robert Harrison was killed. Whether the captain was brother or father of Major Harrison is not known. But his death led to a vendetta that became barbaric. In December private Benjamin Payne was killed. On December 2 both William and Stephen Parish fell to Marion's men. On December 5 Lord Rawdon wrote Cornwallis: "Two brothers of Major Harrison, who were ill of the Small Pox, lay at a house about eight miles in our rear. Last night a scouting party of Rebels burst into the house, shot both of the sick men in their beds, though they were incapable of making the least defense."

Toward the end of December Lieutenant Colonel John Watson Tadwell-Watson, an officer in the 3rd Regiment of Guards, brought the Provincial Light Infantry, a Loyalist regiment recruited around New York, down to Charlestown. Before his arrival, Lord Cornwallis assigned Watson to the command of Lord Rawdon who decided to put him chasing Marion. To lead the fresh troops to the lair of the Swamp Fox, Rawdon called in the South Carolina Rangers. Harrison met Watson at Nelson's Ferry and guided him up the Santee to an old Indian mound. Watson was pleased with the site and started building a little bastion which he named Fort Watson. To help defend the fort, Major Harrison detached Ensign Richard Lewis and a squad of twelve privates.

On February 28, 1781, soon after Watson had garrisoned the little fort, General Thomas Sumter on a foray down the Santee tried to storm the bastion. Repulsed and driven off, Sumter led his troops to his old home in the High Hills, secured his wife and son, and set off toward the Waxhaws. At Styrrup Branch he met a party of Fraser's South Carolina Royalists. "Yesterday Fraser met Sumter, who was advancing this way, between Scape Hoar and Radcliffe's Bridge" Rawdon informed Watson on March 7. "A smart action ensued, in which the enemy were completely routed, leaving ten dead upon the field and forty wounded." Sumter fled across Radcliffe's Bridge and then burned the structure. It was never rebuilt.

Having driven Sumter from the Santee, Rawdon determined to chase Marion out of Snow's Island. He initiated a two-pronged drive: Watson to fight and pin down Marion's troops and Doyle and the Volunteers of Ireland to cut in behind the fighting and destroy Marion's camp on Snow's Island. Early on the morning of March 5 Colonel Watson with his Provincial Light Infantry, the 64th Regiment, and the South Carolina Rangers marched from Fort Watson. At Wiboo Swamp about halfway between Nelson's and Murry's ferries he met the guerrillas under Marion. In bloody, hand-to-hand fighting they drove Marion from the Wiboo.

Marion retreated to Kingstree, crossed Black River, threw the planks off the bridge, and defied Watson to cross. After two weeks Watson made a dash toward Georgetown. Marion caught him at the bridge over Sampit River. Here in vicious fighting the South Carolina Rangers behaved like the veterans they were. But it was their last battle. Watson did not reach Camden in time to fight at Hobkirk's Hill.

When Lord Rawdon evacuated Camden, on May 10, 1781, Harrison followed him to Charlestown. He was stationed at the Quarter House on Charlestown Neck. During the next six months the South Carolina Rangers served as barrack troops. Their morale began to droop. In eighteen months of service their regiment had suffered 42 per cent loss in dead, wounded, missing, and deserted. It is axiomatic that when a military corps suffers a loss of more than ten per cent, it loses its elan, its fighting ability.

The glory and the hope had passed. When Muster Master Rigdon Brice held his muster and inspection on December 24, 1781, the enlistments of the South Carolina Rangers expired. None would reenlist. John Harrison lowered his flag in defeat and resigned his commission as major. The next day he accepted a commission as captain and Sam Harrison accepted one as lieutenant. About a dozen veterans followed them into a troop of South Carolina Dragoons.

When the British evacuated Charlestown on December 14, 1782, they shipped Harrison and his troops to St. Augustine. There he and his men transferred to the infantry of Fraser's South Carolina Royalists. They remained until the signing of a treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain.

In his usual blend of fact and fiction Judge James wrote: "During the contest the major was killed; after it was over, the colonel retired to Jamaica with much wealth acquired by depredations." James was wrong. John Harrison was never promoted to colonel and Sam was never promoted to major. They had served their king valiantly and they retired on half-pay at their highest rank. According to the half-pay records in the Public Record Office in London, John lived until 1795. Although in **Swamp Fox** this writer, following James, killed Sam off at Wiboo Swamp, he survived to enjoy his half-pay until 1816.